What factors inflence a spouse’s eligibility for alimony after divorce under Pennsylvania law?

Under Pennsylvania law, post-divorce alimony “is a secondary remedy . . . available only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of a party cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution award and development of an appropriate employable skill.” These are the well-known words of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in its Opinion in Nemoto v. Nemoto, 620 A.2d 1216 (Pa.Super.1993). Most of the important concepts in alimony jurisprudence are covered in this sentence. First, the trial courts must attempt to divide marital property in a way that avoids the need for post-divorce alimony. Why? Because the courts encourage a complete cessation of financial ties between divorcing spouses. If enough property (particuarly income-generating property) can be conveyed to a divorcing spouse, then that property can fulfill all of the spouse’s economic needs without the financial “umbilical cord” of alimony.

• The value of the assets and liabilities distributed to each of the parties must be considered before awarding alimony. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(10), (16); Fee v. Fee, 496 A.2d 793 (Pa.Super. 1985).
• In its determination of alimony, the trial court must consider the income generated by a spouse’s marital and nonmarital assets. Ressler v. Ressler, 644 A.2d 753 (Pa.Super. 1994).

Second, our Courts encourage spouses to maximize their earning capacity and income potential through appropriate employment. In the first decade of the Divorce Code, enacted in 1980, the law provided that alimony could be awarded only for rehabilitative purposes, such as paying for college or vocational training. Alimony was not permitted in Pennsylvania prior to 1980, and the legislators who enacted the  Divorce Code worried that spouses would lose their incentive to become self-supporting if they could easily receive post-divorce alimony. The alimony law has been revised since 1980, allowing alimony for other reasons, such as meeting the budgetary shortfall of a spouse who is incapable of self-support. Still, the old law remains a strong influence among judges and lawyers in Pennsylvania. Several attempts to modernize the alimony law have failed, primarily because they might reduce a spouse’s incentive to go back to work. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(1), (9), (17).

• The Court imputed an earning capacity to a dependent spouse who devoted her time to an unproductive start-up business instead of seeking gainful employment. Thomson v. Thomson, 519 A.2d 483 (Pa.Super.1986).
• An award of alimony for ten years was deemed excessive when a college education leading to a self-supporting job would require just four years. Barrett v. Barrett, 614 A.2d 299 (Pa.Super.1992).
• In cases where there is no evidence of an impediment that would prevent a spouse from becoming self-supporting, the court is authorized to limit an alimony award. Adelstein v. Adelstein, 553 A.2d 436 (Pa.Super.1989).
• In cases where a spouse’s earning capacity was limited by a medical disability or the disability of a custodial chid, Soncini v. Soncini, 612 A.2d 998 (Pa.Super.1992), the court may decline to impose a full time earning capacity upon a dependent spouse, justifying an award of alimony.

Finally, the law looks to the reasonable needs of a spouse. After a divorce, each spouse must have sufficient cash flow to meet his/her monthly household expenses. Yet, judges realize that two households cannot exist as cheaply as one combined household. The marital standard of living is just one of the seventeen statutory criteria for alimony awards, and in practice, it is one of the least influential. The expenses associated with custody of a child is more influential in an ex-spouse’s request for alimony. Just as important is the ability of a dependent spouse to become self-supporting through appropriate employment and the financial hardship that alimony may cause to the payor. When determining the amount and duration of an alimony award, the courts scrutinize the budget of a spouse seeking alimony carefully. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(7), (8), (13).

• The Court will not allow an award of alimony that would divert twice as much income to the alimony recipient as the payor, which would allow her to enjoy a better standard of living than she had enjoyed during the marriage Ressler v. Ressler, 644 A.2d 753 (Pa.Super.1994).

Marital misconduct is just one of the seventeen factors in awarding alimony, and it has remained one of the least influential since the enactment of the Divorce Code. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(14); Nuttal v. Nuttal, 562 A.2d 841 (Pa.Super.1989).

Each year I am one of the broadcast presenters for Family Law Update, one of the most-watched legal education courses for the Pennsylvania Bar Institute. We make live presentations in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, followed by a satellite broadcast to nearly two dozen counties around Pennsylvania. Traditionally, I have presented the most recent cases involving child support, spousal support and alimony pendente lite.

The Pittsburgh live presentation will be given tomorrow (October 23, 2009), with the satellite broadcast to be given on November 18, 2009. The book is available on PBI’s website, and I publish my Powerpoint slides here.

Update: I have added a page to this site with my Powerpoint slides.

In Krebs v. Krebs (“Krebs II”), 2009 WL 1759726 (Pa.Super. 2009), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania considered whether to award legal fees to a parent who won modification of child support from the other parent, who had concealed increases in his income. This recent decision arose from an earlier case (Krebs v. Krebs (“Krebs I”), 944 A.2d 487 (Pa.Super. 2008)), in which the Court granted retroactive modification for a period prior to the filing of a modification petition due to the payer’s misrepresentation.

Krebs II was a divided decision. The majority ordered Father to reimburse 100% of Mother’s legal fees, or $15,408, to recover $72,603 in child support. The Court remarked about the extensive legal research; drafting of stipulations, briefs and concise statements; court appearances; and negotiations conducted by the Mother’s legal counsel as a direct result of the Father’s fraudulent concealment of his income increases.

A dissenting opinion filed by Judge Klein, however, may have the effect of limiting the majority’s ruling to its facts. Judge Klein wrote that he would have remanded for a more careful examination of the Mother’s legal fees, noting that the trial court found them to be excessive.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently took up the case of Menard v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d 620 (2009), considering whether the CEO of a privately-held company was receiving a dividend disguised as salary from the business he controlled. The CEO whose salary was questioned was John Menard, founder and controlling shareholder of Menards, a chain of retail hardware and building supply stores. The Tax Court took the position that John Menard’s $20 million salary was really a disguised dividend because it was much greater than the salaries of the Home Depot and Lowe’s CEOs, who earned $2.8 million and $6.1 million respectively.

The appellate court’s opinion in this case is so well-researched that I cannot help but include large blocks of text, starting with its introduction to the subject:

The Internal Revenue Code allows a business to deduct from its taxable income a “reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered,”[or] “payments purely for services.” Occasionally the Internal Revenue Service challenges the deduction of a corporate salary on the ground that it’s really a dividend. A dividend, like salary, is taxable to the recipient, but unlike salary is not deductible from the corporation’s taxable income. So by treating a dividend as salary, a corporation can reduce its income tax liability without increasing the income tax of the recipient. . . As a result of a change in law in 2003, dividends are now taxed at a lower maximum rate than salaries—15 percent, versus 35 percent for salary. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11). This makes the tradeoff more complex; although the corporation avoids tax by treating the dividend as a salary, which is deductible, the employee pays a higher tax. But depending on its tax bracket, the corporation may still save more in tax than the employee pays, and in that event, if the employee owns stock in the corporation, he may, depending on how much of the stock he owns, prefer dividends to be treated as salary. . . . Even before the change in the Internal Revenue Code, treating a dividend as salary was less likely to be attempted in a publicly held corporation, because if the CEO or other officers or employees receive dividends called salary beyond what they are entitled to by virtue of owning stock in the corporation, the other shareholders suffer. But in a closely held corporation, the owners might decide to take their dividends in the form of salary in order to beat the corporate income tax, and there would be no one to complain—except the Internal Revenue Service.

The usual case for forbidding the reclassification (for tax purposes) of dividends as salary is thus that “of a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom draw salaries,” Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1), especially if the corporation does not pay dividends (as such) and some of the shareholders do no work for the corporation but merely cash a “salary” check. A difficult case—which is this case—is thus that of a corporation that pays a high salary to its CEO who works full time but is also the controlling shareholder. The Treasury regulation defines a “reasonable” salary as the amount that “would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances,” § 1.162-7(b)(3), but that is not an operational standard. No two enterprises are alike and no two chief executive officers are alike, and anyway the comparison should be between the total compensation package of the CEOs being compared, and that requires consideration of deferred compensation, including severance packages, the amount of risk in the executives’ compensation, and perks.

Courts have attempted to operationalize the Treasury’s standard by considering multiple factors that relate to optimal compensation. [Citations omitted.] We reviewed a number of these attempts in Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir.1999), and concluded that they were too vague, and too difficult to operationalize, to be of much utility. Multifactor tests with no weight assigned to any factor are bad enough from the standpoint of providing an objective basis for a judicial decision [citations omitted]; multifactor tests when none of the factors is concrete are worse, and that is the character of most of the multifactor tests of excessive compensation. . . . All businesses are different, all CEOs are different, and all compensation packages for CEOs are different.

In Exacto, in an effort to bring a modicum of objectivity to the determination of whether a corporate owner/employee’s compensation is “reasonable,” we created the presumption that “when . . . the investors in his company are obtaining a far higher return than they had any reason to expect, [the owner/employee’s] salary is presumptively reasonable.” But we added that the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the company’s success was the result of extraneous factors, such as an unexpected discovery of oil under the company’s land, or that the company intended to pay the owner/employee a disguised dividend rather than salary. 196 F.3d at 839.

The strongest ground for rebuttal, which brings us back to the basic purpose of disallowing “unreasonable” compensation, is that the employee does no work for the corporation; he is merely a shareholder. [Citations omitted.] Comparison with the compensation of executives of other companies can be helpful if—but it is a big if—the comparison takes into account the details of the compensation package of each of the compared executives, and not just the bottom-line salary. This qualification will turn out to be critical in this case.

Having explained the context of this case, the Circuit Court next explained why the Tax Court’s analysis was wrong, especially its comparison of John Menard’s salary to the salaries earned by the Home Depot and Lowe’s CEOs in that year. The appellate court first rejected the notion that the taxpayer’s $17 million bonus, which was equal to 5% of the company’s net income before taxes, was more likely to be a dividend than salary because it was paid at year’s end; was approved by a board that the CEO controlled without outside directors; must be returned if the IRS should disallow the company’s tax deduction as salary; and exceeded the salaries earned by the CEOs of publicly-traded competitors (Home Depot and Lowe’s). The appellate court noted that the managers of privately-held companies often face greater risk than public companies, warranting greater reward for success:

Of particular importance to this case is the amount of risk in the compensation structure. Risk in corporate compensation is significant in two respects. First, most people are risk averse, and the scholarly literature on corporate compensation suggests that risk aversion is actually an obstacle to efficient corporate management because managers tend to be more risk averse than shareholders. Shareholders can diversify the risk of a particular company by owning a diversified portfolio, but a manager tends to have most of his financial, reputational, and “specific human” capital tied up in his job. [Citations omitted.] So the riskier the compensation structure, other things being equal, the higher the executive’s salary must be to compensate him for bearing the additional risk.

That is not a critical consideration in this case because, as we said, management and ownership in Menards are not divorced. But a second significance of risk in a compensation structure is fully applicable to this case. A risky compensation structure implies that the executive’s salary is likely to vary substantially from year to year—high when the company has a good year, low when it has a bad one. Mr. Menard’s average annual income may thus have been considerably less than $20 million—a possibility the Tax Court ignored. Had the corporation lost money in 1998, Menard’s total compensation would have been only $157,500—less than the salary of a federal judge—even if the loss had not been his fault. The 5 percent bonus plan was in effect for a quarter of a century before the IRS pounced; was it just waiting for Menard to have such a great year that the IRS would
have a great-looking case?

The appellate court also noted that the Tax Court had not considered the total compensation packages of the CEOs from the public companies, such as equity compensation, severance packages, retirement plans, and perks. The appellate court noted that the CEO of Home Depot, whose salary was used as a benchmark, actually earned $124 million over six years, and a $210 million severance package when he was forced out. The Court of Appeals also noted that the Tax Court had not considered the salaries of other senior managers, both of Menards and of the benchmark public companies, which may have indicated that this CEO was more productive and delegated less than average. The Court observed that John Menard worked 14 to 16 hours per day, six to seven days per week.

The Seventh Circuit adopted a skeptical, even sarcastic, tone toward the Tax Court’s remark that the owner of a business has no need for incentive compensation because ownership is incentive enough. The Court of Appeals held that owners should not be treated differently from other managers.

Having concluded that John Menard’s $20 million salary was not excessive, the Court of Appeals reversed.

BVWire recently published a follow-up to its teleconference, Valuing Dental Practices, by raising a question about business valuation using the excess earnings method (also known as Treasury Method).

Where do you get your cap rates under an excess earnings method? It’s a question that came up at the recent BVR teleconference, Valuing Dental Practices, featuring BV experts James Andersen, Ron Seigneur, and Stephen Persichetti, a practicing dentist and professor of dental practice management. In answer to the query, one panelist explained, “When you’re using excess earnings, it’s appraiser’s judgment. I’ve seen reports that use Ibbotson or D&P. But your cap rate has to be larger, and sometimes significantly higher, as much as 40% and 60%.”

The BVWire™put the question to Seigneur, who cautioned, “There is no holy grail for developing the capitalization rate under the excess earnings method.” That said, he offered the following insights as a “reality check” for BV experts:

When breaking the economic returns of an enterprise out between the returns on tangible assets and the returns on the intangible assets, it is commonly accepted theory that the returns on the tangible asset base is less risky, and therefore, require a lower economic return to justify the risks associated with the tangible assets. On the other hand, the rates of return required for each class of assets (be they tangible, like cash, inventory, fixed assets, etc., or intangible, such as the reputation of the business, the customer base, etc.) must collectively reconcile to the overall economic return (e.g. capitalization rate) on the overall, all in, benefit stream of the entity.

For example:

If the enterprise is assumed to justify a 30% overall capitalization rate, the returns on the various categories of tangible assets will likely each be below this 30% combined return. The returns required to capture the risks of the various intangibles will likely each be above 30%, with the overall weighted or blended rates tying back to the 30% overall risk adjusted rate associated with the entity take as a whole.

I’m not sure I know the answer to this one, so I’m throwing it out there for comments.

This is the fourth in a series of posts containing summaries of Pennsylvania case law on the issue of double dipping in divorce. “Double dipping” occurs when an income-producing asset (such as a pension or business) is counted as marital property subject to equitable distribution, as well as income subject to an alimony or child support obligation.

McFadden v. McFadden, 563 A.2d 180 (Pa.Super.1989).

            McFadden was a post-divorce alimony modification proceeding.  In this case, the husband’s pension annuity benefit was in pay status, and he was receiving the entire pension benefit. Yet, the court found that the husband’s pension had not been identified as marital property at the time of equitable distribution. Therefore, the Superior Court did not reverse the trial court’s calculation of the husband’s income, which included the pension benefit. Most troubling, in dicta, the Superior Court held (per Popovich, J.): “[I]t is equally clear that income from a pension is to be considered when fashioning an alimony award, even if the pension was previously subjected to equitable distribution. See 23 Pa.S.A. § 501(b)(3), (10), (13); Pacella v. Pacella, 342 Pa.Super. 178, 190, 2492 A.2d 707, 711-712 (1985)(court did not err in consideration earlier equitable distribution property in fashioning alimony); Braderman, 488 A.2d at 620 (pension subject to equitable distribution also may be used to calculate alimony award).”

Columnist Amy Feldman wrote an interesting article in this week’s Business Week entitled, “When to Take the Money.” June 30 is the deadline for executives to decide whether to defer this year’s performance bonuses to qualified plans. Ms. Feldman’s column suggests how to decide.

In Pennsylvania, child support is based on the net incomes of the parents, so it shouldn’t be difficult to figure, right? Um, wrong.  It might seem as simple as looking at a W-2 or pay stub, or perhaps a tax return, to figure each parent’s net income, but child support is not based on take-home pay. The definition of income under the child support law includes more and less than taxable income. Here are some (but not all) of the differences between take-home pay and net income:

1. 401(k) contributions – On a pay stub, 401(k) contributions are deductions that reduce an employee’s net income. In divorce court, however, 401(k) contributions are added back to a parent’s income in most instances. In fact, if an employer makes unmatched contributions to the parent’s 401(k) plan, those contributions might be added to the parent’s income even though it is not take-home pay.

2. Disability insurance, life insurance, savings bonds – Some employees elect to pay for group disability or life insurance policies through pretax deductions, or defer part of their income into savings bonds and credit unions. These elections reduce their take-home pay, but the divorce court generally adds it back to net income.

3. Restricted stock – When restricted stock vests, it is generally reported as income on a pay stub or W-2. If the restricted stock was issued prior to separation, however, it might be marital property. The restricted stock can be considered as income for support purposes, or property for equitable distribution purposes, but not both. Therefore, restricted stock is excluded from net income in some cases.

4. Pass-through income – An owner of a business organized as a partnership or  Subchapter “S” corporation receives an annual K-1 form which reports his or her share of the business income. In reality, the business might not distribute the partner’s entire share of profits. Some businesses distribute just enough to enable the partner to pay his or her taxes. In divorce court, the retained earnings of a business may be excluded from the owner’s income if they were not actually distributed and the owner does not own a controlling interest.

A recent decision issued by Florida’s intermediate appellate court, Craissati v. Craissati, amply demonstrates the importance of good contract writing skill. The husband and wife in this case entered into a marital settlement agreement, in which the husband agreed to pay alimony for eight years. Like most alimony agreements, this agreement provided that the alimony would terminate upon the death of the recipient, her remarriage, or cohabitation for a period of three months or more.

The wife in this case was incarcerated after a DUI conviction, and the husband petitioned the court for termination of his contractual alimony obligation. The parties stipulated that wife was, technically, “cohabiting” with her cell mate for a period in excess of three months, and that the termination clause of the marital settlement agreement was unambiguous. Still, the trial court held, the termination of alimony due to incarceration would be an absurd result not within the contemplation of the parties. The trial court modified the amount of alimony (since wife’s needs had been temporarily curtailed) but refused to terminate the obligation.

On appeal, the Florida appellate court reversed, adopting a literal construction of the agreement. Adding insult to injury, the author of the opinion found that driving under the influence was a voluntary act known to possibly result in incarceration, so the wife should have known that her criminal behavior could result in the termination of alimony.

If only the prisons were less crowded, the wife could have maintained her alimony award, I guess.

At the Pennsylvania Bar Association Family Law Section Winter Meeting 2009, which took place at the William Penn Hotel in Pittsburgh this weekend, a panel of judges, lawyers and CPAs discussed hot topics in family law and business valuation. One of the hot topics, presented by Pittsburgh valuation professional Richard F. Brabender, was double dipping. Specifically, this seminar discussed the theoretical/academic argument (which I have advocated in this blog) that a double dip exists where capitalized income which has been divided between the spouses as marital property is also counted as income for child support or alimony purposes.

Clearly, if there is a pension in pay status which is valued on the date of trial, and the pension annuity benefit is counted as income for calculating post-divorce alimony, the court has divided the same stream of income twice – a “double dip.” This same problem exists where business profits have been capitalized as part of the valuation process and also included in the business owner’s net income for child support and alimony purposes.

The twist that Dick Brabender brought to light in his presentation was the double dip that may occur during the separation, where the owner’s compensation substantially exceeds a market salary. For instance, if a business owner is drawing $500,000 per year from the business, but could hired a newly-minted MBA (because we all know how they can improve any business) to do the owner’s job for $70,000 a year, then the owner is receiving excessive compensation of $430,000 per year. Why shouldn’t the business owner’s spouse get 50% of the excess compensation during the separation period as an advance against his or her share of the marital property (assuming the business is entirely marital), subject to re-allocation at the time of trial? (The excess compensation would then be excluded from both spouses’ incomes for support purposes.) This is the likely result if there were a marital pension in pay status, which could be divided 50/50 during the pendency of litigation as an advance of marital property.

In order to accomplish this interim division of the business income stream, the court would have to conduct a hearing to determine that the owner’s compensation were excessive, something the court is unlikely to decide in motions court. Moreover, the excess compensation hearing would have to occur prior to the support or maintenance hearing so that there were no inconsistencies between the support order and the property advance. One of the panelists, eastern Pennsylvania lawyer Mark Ashton, suggested that the court would also have to look at whether the rents being paid by the business to the owner were consistent with market levels, whether the owner were working more than 40 hours a week, etc. Suddenly a simple hearing to determine a property advance has become a multi-day trial with multiple expert witnesses!

Another panelist, Jay Blechman, suggested an alternative: a lookback at the time of the final property division trial. In other words, if it were proven at the end of the case that the owner’s compensation during the pendency of litigation was above-market, then the court could re-designate the excessive income as marital property and award an incremental amount to the owner’s spouse. In Pennsylvania, a business owner’s spouse without children would receive 40% of the income stream as support or maintenance, but if the excess compensation were marital property, the spouse might 50%, 55% or more. So, Jay Blechman suggested that the business owner’s spouse could get 40% during the pendency of the case, and an additional 10%, 15% or more of the excessive compensation at the end of the case.

No case law supports this idea yet.