The South Carolina Family Law Blog contains a great list of frequently-overlooked or hidden assets in divorce. Some of the more interesting items are:

1.Frequent flyer mileage
2.Security deposits (e.g., utilities, car lease)
****
8.Unused vacation, sick leave
****
10.Income tax refunds
11.Income tax capital loss carry-forwards
****
24.Burial plots
****
30.Cash
****
34.Options to purchase property
35.Unpaid commissions on deals set to close
****
39.Taxes prepaid

In our area, don’t forget about subsurface mineral rights, another overlooked asset.

What factors inflence a spouse’s eligibility for alimony after divorce under Pennsylvania law?

Under Pennsylvania law, post-divorce alimony “is a secondary remedy . . . available only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of a party cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution award and development of an appropriate employable skill.” These are the well-known words of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in its Opinion in Nemoto v. Nemoto, 620 A.2d 1216 (Pa.Super.1993). Most of the important concepts in alimony jurisprudence are covered in this sentence. First, the trial courts must attempt to divide marital property in a way that avoids the need for post-divorce alimony. Why? Because the courts encourage a complete cessation of financial ties between divorcing spouses. If enough property (particuarly income-generating property) can be conveyed to a divorcing spouse, then that property can fulfill all of the spouse’s economic needs without the financial “umbilical cord” of alimony.

• The value of the assets and liabilities distributed to each of the parties must be considered before awarding alimony. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(10), (16); Fee v. Fee, 496 A.2d 793 (Pa.Super. 1985).
• In its determination of alimony, the trial court must consider the income generated by a spouse’s marital and nonmarital assets. Ressler v. Ressler, 644 A.2d 753 (Pa.Super. 1994).

Second, our Courts encourage spouses to maximize their earning capacity and income potential through appropriate employment. In the first decade of the Divorce Code, enacted in 1980, the law provided that alimony could be awarded only for rehabilitative purposes, such as paying for college or vocational training. Alimony was not permitted in Pennsylvania prior to 1980, and the legislators who enacted the  Divorce Code worried that spouses would lose their incentive to become self-supporting if they could easily receive post-divorce alimony. The alimony law has been revised since 1980, allowing alimony for other reasons, such as meeting the budgetary shortfall of a spouse who is incapable of self-support. Still, the old law remains a strong influence among judges and lawyers in Pennsylvania. Several attempts to modernize the alimony law have failed, primarily because they might reduce a spouse’s incentive to go back to work. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(1), (9), (17).

• The Court imputed an earning capacity to a dependent spouse who devoted her time to an unproductive start-up business instead of seeking gainful employment. Thomson v. Thomson, 519 A.2d 483 (Pa.Super.1986).
• An award of alimony for ten years was deemed excessive when a college education leading to a self-supporting job would require just four years. Barrett v. Barrett, 614 A.2d 299 (Pa.Super.1992).
• In cases where there is no evidence of an impediment that would prevent a spouse from becoming self-supporting, the court is authorized to limit an alimony award. Adelstein v. Adelstein, 553 A.2d 436 (Pa.Super.1989).
• In cases where a spouse’s earning capacity was limited by a medical disability or the disability of a custodial chid, Soncini v. Soncini, 612 A.2d 998 (Pa.Super.1992), the court may decline to impose a full time earning capacity upon a dependent spouse, justifying an award of alimony.

Finally, the law looks to the reasonable needs of a spouse. After a divorce, each spouse must have sufficient cash flow to meet his/her monthly household expenses. Yet, judges realize that two households cannot exist as cheaply as one combined household. The marital standard of living is just one of the seventeen statutory criteria for alimony awards, and in practice, it is one of the least influential. The expenses associated with custody of a child is more influential in an ex-spouse’s request for alimony. Just as important is the ability of a dependent spouse to become self-supporting through appropriate employment and the financial hardship that alimony may cause to the payor. When determining the amount and duration of an alimony award, the courts scrutinize the budget of a spouse seeking alimony carefully. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(7), (8), (13).

• The Court will not allow an award of alimony that would divert twice as much income to the alimony recipient as the payor, which would allow her to enjoy a better standard of living than she had enjoyed during the marriage Ressler v. Ressler, 644 A.2d 753 (Pa.Super.1994).

Marital misconduct is just one of the seventeen factors in awarding alimony, and it has remained one of the least influential since the enactment of the Divorce Code. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(14); Nuttal v. Nuttal, 562 A.2d 841 (Pa.Super.1989).

A recently-issued IRS ruling (Rev.Rul.2008-41) addressed the issue of whether a charitable remainder annuity trust (CRAT) or charitable remander unitrust (CRUT) can be divided into two equal trusts upon divorce. A charitable remainder annuity trust is a trust in which the grantor receives income in the form of an annuity payment until his or her death, after which the trust principal is donated to charity. The annuity may not be less than 5% nor more than 50% of the trust principal. A CRUT is the same thing, except that the income payments are a fixed percentage of the principal.

Rev.Rul. 2008-41 established that it is possible to divide a CRAT or CRUT into two equal trusts whose terms are identical to the original trust, except that each spouse is the income beneficiary of one of the two resulting trusts. The resulting trusts are qualified as CRATs or CRUTs under IRS regulations, and no excise tax is triggered by the division of the trusts.

A more detailed article on this subject is available from our friends at Strategic Valuation Group in Warren, Ohio.

This post is not intended as tax advice and should not be used to avoid tax penalties by our readers, who should seek tax advice that is specific to their individual circumstances.

The Supreme Court of North Dakota has been asked to decide whether breast implants should be identified as marital property and valued for divorce purposes. Clearly, the owner’s husband is the advocate of this novel argument. His lawyer argued that the expense should be included in instances when a medical expense is “clearly cosmetic, elective, (and) non-necessary.” Insurance companies often make those judgments in deciding what to cover, she said.

The trial judge reported to news sources that he considered the argument to be frivolous. “I can’t imagine people would actually waste time thinking that breast implants are marital assets. It just defies common sense,” the judge stated. “I don’t know how you would expect me to award breast implants, if you want me to have them cut out and given to Mr. Isaacson. It is absolutely nonsense.”

The implant owner’s husband valued the implants at $5,500. No word on whether they might depreciate over time.

Here is an interesting issue, not yet resolved by the Pennsylvania courts: whether the proceeds of a life insurance death benefit may be counted as a marital asset. Here’s the story:

Let’s say that husband and wife are separated, and one of them dies. If the grounds for divorce existed prior to the death (i.e., both spouses filed their affidavits of consent, or they were separated two years prior to the death), the divorce action does not abate. The deceased spouse’s estate becomes a party to the divorce action, which must go on to its conclusion. If the deceased spouse was insured under a life insurance policy (let’s say a whole life or universal policy, which has cash value), then someone is going to receive a death benefit.

Perhaps the surviving spouse was named as the death beneficiary before the spouses were separated. The divorce court might have even entered an order compelling the now-deceased spouse to name the surviving spouse as the beneficiary under the life insurance policy. (We will discuss the other possibility – that the deceased spouse named someone other than the surviving spouse as beneficiary – another time.) 

The death benefit of a life insurance policy is usually greater than its cash value. (For a whole life or universal life policy, the cash value is equal to the excess premiums that were paid over the cost of term insurance; the excess premiums accumulate, and the insurance company invests them for the benefit of the policy owner.)  In a divorce case where whole or universal life insurance is a marital asset, the asset value is generally equal to the cash value less any policy loans. But now that a spouse is dead, there is no cash value. There is only the proceeds of the life insurance death benefit, which likely exceed the cash value. Is the death benefit a marital asset?

It might depend on what our law means by the word “acquired.” You see, property acquired prior to separation is marital property unless it falls into one of the statutory exclusions. The policy itself was acquired during the marriage, but the death benefit was not acquired until after separation (which would make it separate property). In the case of a personal injury settlement or verdict, our law says that the property is “acquired” when the settlement agreement is signed or the judge enters the verdict, even if the injury occurred prior to separation. The post-separation settlement or verdict does not “relate back” to the pre-separation injury under our law, so it is not marital property.

But there is a problem. If we treat life insurance proceeds like personal injury settlements, then a marital asset (the cash value) has disappeared and there is no marital asset to replace it.

Property which is received in exchange for marital property is, generally, marital property. For instance, if a divorcing couple owns a bank account, and after separation, someone withdraws money to buy a TV, the TV is marital property. So a life insurance policy could be viewed as a lottery ticket that was purchased prior to separation, and its proceeds would be deemed to be property received in exchange for marital property, which is still marital property.

What if the deceased spouse named someone other than the surviving spouse as a beneficiary? The analysis becomes even more troublesome, because now we have to balance the interests of the surviving spouse against the interests of a third party. If we decide that the life insurance proceeds are entirely non-marital, then the marital estate may be diminished. But if we decide the proceeds are marital, a third party’s property rights are impaired. As I mentioned, the courts have not yet resolved this matter.