marital property

The South Carolina Family Law Blog contains a great list of frequently-overlooked or hidden assets in divorce. Some of the more interesting items are:

1.Frequent flyer mileage
2.Security deposits (e.g., utilities, car lease)
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8.Unused vacation, sick leave
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10.Income tax refunds
11.Income tax capital loss carry-forwards
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24.Burial plots
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30.Cash
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34.Options to purchase property
35.Unpaid commissions on deals set to close
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39.Taxes prepaid

In our area, don’t forget about subsurface mineral rights, another overlooked asset.

What factors inflence a spouse’s eligibility for alimony after divorce under Pennsylvania law?

Under Pennsylvania law, post-divorce alimony “is a secondary remedy . . . available only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of a party cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution award and development of an appropriate employable skill.” These are the well-known words of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in its Opinion in Nemoto v. Nemoto, 620 A.2d 1216 (Pa.Super.1993). Most of the important concepts in alimony jurisprudence are covered in this sentence. First, the trial courts must attempt to divide marital property in a way that avoids the need for post-divorce alimony. Why? Because the courts encourage a complete cessation of financial ties between divorcing spouses. If enough property (particuarly income-generating property) can be conveyed to a divorcing spouse, then that property can fulfill all of the spouse’s economic needs without the financial “umbilical cord” of alimony.

• The value of the assets and liabilities distributed to each of the parties must be considered before awarding alimony. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(10), (16); Fee v. Fee, 496 A.2d 793 (Pa.Super. 1985).
• In its determination of alimony, the trial court must consider the income generated by a spouse’s marital and nonmarital assets. Ressler v. Ressler, 644 A.2d 753 (Pa.Super. 1994).

Second, our Courts encourage spouses to maximize their earning capacity and income potential through appropriate employment. In the first decade of the Divorce Code, enacted in 1980, the law provided that alimony could be awarded only for rehabilitative purposes, such as paying for college or vocational training. Alimony was not permitted in Pennsylvania prior to 1980, and the legislators who enacted the  Divorce Code worried that spouses would lose their incentive to become self-supporting if they could easily receive post-divorce alimony. The alimony law has been revised since 1980, allowing alimony for other reasons, such as meeting the budgetary shortfall of a spouse who is incapable of self-support. Still, the old law remains a strong influence among judges and lawyers in Pennsylvania. Several attempts to modernize the alimony law have failed, primarily because they might reduce a spouse’s incentive to go back to work. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(1), (9), (17).

• The Court imputed an earning capacity to a dependent spouse who devoted her time to an unproductive start-up business instead of seeking gainful employment. Thomson v. Thomson, 519 A.2d 483 (Pa.Super.1986).
• An award of alimony for ten years was deemed excessive when a college education leading to a self-supporting job would require just four years. Barrett v. Barrett, 614 A.2d 299 (Pa.Super.1992).
• In cases where there is no evidence of an impediment that would prevent a spouse from becoming self-supporting, the court is authorized to limit an alimony award. Adelstein v. Adelstein, 553 A.2d 436 (Pa.Super.1989).
• In cases where a spouse’s earning capacity was limited by a medical disability or the disability of a custodial chid, Soncini v. Soncini, 612 A.2d 998 (Pa.Super.1992), the court may decline to impose a full time earning capacity upon a dependent spouse, justifying an award of alimony.

Finally, the law looks to the reasonable needs of a spouse. After a divorce, each spouse must have sufficient cash flow to meet his/her monthly household expenses. Yet, judges realize that two households cannot exist as cheaply as one combined household. The marital standard of living is just one of the seventeen statutory criteria for alimony awards, and in practice, it is one of the least influential. The expenses associated with custody of a child is more influential in an ex-spouse’s request for alimony. Just as important is the ability of a dependent spouse to become self-supporting through appropriate employment and the financial hardship that alimony may cause to the payor. When determining the amount and duration of an alimony award, the courts scrutinize the budget of a spouse seeking alimony carefully. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(7), (8), (13).

• The Court will not allow an award of alimony that would divert twice as much income to the alimony recipient as the payor, which would allow her to enjoy a better standard of living than she had enjoyed during the marriage Ressler v. Ressler, 644 A.2d 753 (Pa.Super.1994).

Marital misconduct is just one of the seventeen factors in awarding alimony, and it has remained one of the least influential since the enactment of the Divorce Code. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(14); Nuttal v. Nuttal, 562 A.2d 841 (Pa.Super.1989).

The Supreme Court of North Dakota has been asked to decide whether breast implants should be identified as marital property and valued for divorce purposes. Clearly, the owner’s husband is the advocate of this novel argument. His lawyer argued that the expense should be included in instances when a medical expense is “clearly cosmetic, elective, (and) non-necessary.” Insurance companies often make those judgments in deciding what to cover, she said.

The trial judge reported to news sources that he considered the argument to be frivolous. “I can’t imagine people would actually waste time thinking that breast implants are marital assets. It just defies common sense,” the judge stated. “I don’t know how you would expect me to award breast implants, if you want me to have them cut out and given to Mr. Isaacson. It is absolutely nonsense.”

The implant owner’s husband valued the implants at $5,500. No word on whether they might depreciate over time.

During the statewide broadcast of PBI’s Family Law Update today, my colleague David Ladov asked me to post the features that a marital settlement agreement would have to contain in order to qualify as a QDRO (qualified domestic relations order). A QDRO is one of two possible ways that someone may waive his or her right to receive a share of his or her ex-spouse’s retirement benefits (the other being a beneficiary designation form). According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Kennedy v. Dupont, a marital settlement agreement by itself was not good enough to waive an ex-wife’s interest in an employer-sponsored pension plan, in the absence of a QDRO or beneficiary designation form.

I suggested during the broadcast that some divorce lawyers might wish to avoid this problem by crafting marital settlement agreements that would qualify as QDROs.  The requirements for QDROs under federal law are summarized on the website of the employee benefits administrator Hewitt Associates, as follows:

1. The instrument must be a court order, judgment or decree signed by a judge or other state-approved court official.
2. The instrument must relate to marital property rights or alimony, or the support of a child of the participant.
3. The instrument must contain a statement that it is issued pursuant to state domestic relations law.
4. The instrument must include the name, last known address, social security number and date of birth of the participant and alternate payee.
5. The instrument must describe the amount or percentage of benefits to be awarded to the alternate payee.
6. The instrument must indicate the manner of payment and when payments begin.

There are a couple of additional requirements (actually, three things the QDRO cannot do) that are described on Hewitt’s web site. In a case where a spouse is waiving his or her rights to an ex-spouse’s retirement benefits, these last few requirements might be irrelevant.

The first requirement listed above could be an obstacle in counties where settlement agreements are not routinely attached to the divorce decree or filed of record. Yet, a consent order incorporating a marital settlement agreement should be sufficient to satisfy this requirement. It is less clear that a consent order referring to an unattached settlement agreement might satisfy the requirement.

My friend from the East, Michael Viola, publishes a great divorce blog that occasionally chronicles the divorce of Jon and Kate Gosselin (which has been playing out in Eastern Pennsylvania). Recently Michael reported about a series of motions in which Kate accused Jon of withdrawing $230,000 from their joint bank account, leaving nothing for Kate. Michael summarized the law concerning spousal withdrawals, which is worthwhile reading.

I have a couple of rules about spousal withdrawals:

1. Live by the sword, die by the sword. Some lawyers advise clients to withdraw as much as they can before litigation commences.  I generally do not subscribe to this advice. It is a surefire way to foment litigation and hard feelings, which impedes settlement. Still, it is not always wrong to withdraw some of the money to pay joint debts or set up a nest egg to pay household bills and professional fees during separation.

2. Use freeze orders judiciously. One technique to prevent a raid against the marital savings is an injunction to prevent unauthorized withdrawals. We can’t obtain an injunction until someone has filed a support or divorce action, however, so freeze orders can’t prevent pre-emptive strikes. Still, some judges will force spouses to return the money if the issue is promptly brought to the court’s attention.

3. Logic is persuasive. If there is a good logical reason to withdraw the money or preserve it, let your lawyer know as soon as possible.  Contentious motions can be avoided if both spouses agree to set aside money for year-end taxes or tuition bills; and if they don’t agree, a judge may be persuaded.

BVWire.com reported this week on a recent California case where the issue of double dipping was examined in the context of divorcing business owners:

The husband owned a produce company in California, valued at $5.6 million, ostensibly under the capitalization/excess earnings method. After a marriage of “long duration and substantial standard of living,” the trial court awarded the wife $20,000 per month in spousal support plus half ($2.8 million) of the business. The husband appealed, urging a blanket prohibition against double dipping—i.e., using the same stream of earnings to determine business value/property division and also support.

In Blazer v. Blazer (No. DR 38292, Aug. 25, 2009), the California Court of Appeals discusses the excess earnings method and, in particular, the myriad ways to distinguish personal from enterprise goodwill. It also considers the double-dipping precedent from other jurisdictions as well as its own cases concerning pension divisions. In the end, the court sidesteps the issue by finding insufficient proof that the husband’s expert in fact valued the business by capitalizing his future income stream. Moreover, “the earnings of an ongoing business…do not always derive solely from the personal efforts of its operator, nor is there evidence that such is the case here.” The court explicitly confirmed the equity of the spousal award in this case as well as the trial court’s implicit determination that there was no double counting of the husband’s income.

Thus, the question remains open in California and elsewhere—especially for cases concerning owners of a professional firm or solo practice whose interests are valued under the excess earnings method. Look for a full summary of Blazer and our continuing analysis of double dipping in the November Business Valuation Update™.

This weekend I am in Chicago to attend the BVR Divorce Conference. I will read the case and many others while I am there, so I will have much to report about when I return!

Note: this decision was originally published on April 17, 2009, reaching a different result. It was re-argued en banc, and the final decision issued on August 21, 2009.

If you haven’t read the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s recent decision en banc in Estate of Sauers (2009), start with the dissenting opinion. The facts were simple: the husband did not change the beneficiary of his employer-based life insurance policy after his divorce. He died. The plan administrator honored the beneficiary designation and paid the $40,000 in life insurance benefit to the ex-wife. The husband’s estate sued the ex-wife to recover the proceeds under § 6111.2 of the Probate Estates and Fiduciaries Code. That law says that a beneficiary designation in favor of an ex-spouse is automatically revoked upon divorce unless the designation was clearly intended to survive the divorce. The ex-wife tried to dismiss the estate’s lawsuit against her but failed. When the trial court refused to dismiss the suit, the ex-wife took an appeal. The Superior Court initially reversed the trial court’s order, but after reargument en banc, affirmed the trial court’s order allowing the estate to seek recovery of the proceeds from the ex-wife.

In her dissenting opinion, Judge Mary Jane Bowes of the Superior Court dissected § 6111.2 to see whether it was pre-empted by ERISA, the federal law that governs employee benefits like pensions and life insurance. She identified three distinct clauses in the state law: (1) a redesignation clause (which revokes beneficiary designations); (2) a prior restraint clause (which protects the plan if it pays the ex-spouse); and (3) a remedy clause (which makes the ex-spouse liable to anyone who should have received the benefit). Judge Bowes concluded that the first and second clauses were pre-empted by federal law, but the third clause was not.

The majority held that state law was not pre-empted. Like the dissenter, the majority of the Superior Court cited Egelhoff (2001), a Washington Supreme Court decision holding that Washington’s redesignation statute was pre-empted by ERISA.

In this author’s opinion, the only material distinction between Egelhoff and this case was that the ex-wife in Egelhoff received a pension and life insurance proceeds. In Egelhoff, the Washington Supreme Court held that its redesignation statute conflicted with ERISA’s mandate requiring plans to make payments to beneficiaries “designated by a participant or by the terms of the plan.” Accordingly, the state law was pre-empted by federal law.

The majority in Sauers never really considered the redesignation clause in the first sentence of Pennsylvania’s statute. They skipped directly to the second sentence, which protects plans from liability if they pay the “wrong” person. The majority held: “Plan documents continue to control the administration, and the objective of a national uniform administrative format is maintained.” In other words, there is no conflict with federal law because plans cannot be penalized for paying the designated beneficiary contrary to state law. 

The majority acknowledged that a law which requires payment of benefits into court or to a person who is not the plan beneficiary would conflict with ERISA. Yet, the majority did not consider the first sentence of § 6111.2, which provides: “any designation in favor of his former spouse . . . shall become ineffective for all purposes….” Perhaps the majority overlooked this sentence because it did not contain the word “revoke.”

The majority compared § 6111.2 to the QDRO provisions of ERISA, which are an exception to the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA. Yet, a QDRO is authorized by federal law, not state law. The U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized an exception to ERISA that is based on state law.

The majority also noted that the Western District’s decision in Metropolitan Life v. Walsh (1995)(holding § 6111.2 was pre-empted by ERISA) was not precedential in state court. Yet, the majority made no attempt to distinguish Met Life or its rationale.

Curiously, the majority’s opinion began with the proposition that there are three forms of federal pre-emption. The majority correctly held that express pre-emption was an issue in this case, but never examined the other two forms of pre-emption. Having found that Pennsylvania’s law was not expressly pre-empted, the majority never considered whether it might be pre-empted under one of the two other branches.

The Pennsylvania Divorce Code says that the court must consider the homemaker’s contribution. When representing a stay-at-home spouse, it may be helpful to prove that the spouse was an active homemaker whose efforts enabled the breadwinner to devote more time and attention to his or her career. A homemaker’s contributions might include: 

• meal planning and shopping
• cooking
• cleaning
• researching and selecting furniture, carpets, wall coverings, decorations, vehicles, appliances, clothing, service providers
• scheduling and supervising home repairs, service calls and maintenance (plumbers, appliance repairmen, tree service, etc.)
• child care (including feeding, bathing, dressing, making school lunches, administering discipline, attending school conferences, assisting with homework, arranging extracurricular activities, scheduling and keeping appointments with doctors, picking up children at school when ill, etc.)
• caring for elderly or disabled family members
• bill paying and budgeting
• entertaining clients and business associates
• vacation planning
• participating in community and charitable organizations

 When representing a working spouse, it may be helpful to prove that these tasks were not performed by the stay-at-home spouse or were shared.

In divorce litigation where one of the spouses owns a professional practice, such as a medical practice, dental practice, law firm or accounting firm, the lawyers and their experts have to determine whether the business has value. Their determination depends upon whether the professional practice is believed to have enterprise goodwill.

Briefly, enterprise goodwill is the price that a buyer would pay for a professional practice over and above the value of its hard assets like equipment and supplies. In theoretical terms, enterprise goodwill is the reputation of the business that is not closely associated with a particular owner or professional. The opposite of enterprise goodwill is personal goodwill, which is the reputation and skill of the professional. Enterprise goodwill has value because it is transferrable but personal goodwill is not. Someone might be willing to pay for a name like Aspen Dental Systems, but what about Jane Doe, PC?

Increasingly, there is a market for professional practices that are not part of a regional or national chain. Dental practices, even those with a single location and single dentist, are bought and sold frequently. The same is true for specialty medical practics. Yet, primary care medical practices and legal practices are rarely bought or sold. So, how does a lawyer decide whether a professional practice should be evaluated by a business valuation specialist? Here are three signs that a professional practice might have value:

1. Actual transactions. If a professional or his/her partners have bought or sold their practices, it is more likely that there is transferrable enterprise goodwill. However, you must distinguish market transactions from succession planning. If the only transactions are between retiring partners and advancing associates, then there may not be much enterprise goodwill.

2.  Subordinates and equipment.  One reason why dental practices are increasingly transferrable is that dental procedures are performed by hygenists and associate dentists. If the owner of the practice is earning profit from other professionals and paraprofessionals, then a buyer might be willing to pay something to step into those shoes.

3.  Excess compensation. If a professional is earning substantially more than industry standards, then the professional’s practice might have enterprise goodwill. No buyer would pay to assume an existing practice if he or she could start a new practice for free – except if the existing practice were more profitable than a new practice would be. This criteria is based on the principle of substitution.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently took up the case of Menard v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d 620 (2009), considering whether the CEO of a privately-held company was receiving a dividend disguised as salary from the business he controlled. The CEO whose salary was questioned was John Menard, founder and controlling shareholder of Menards, a chain of retail hardware and building supply stores. The Tax Court took the position that John Menard’s $20 million salary was really a disguised dividend because it was much greater than the salaries of the Home Depot and Lowe’s CEOs, who earned $2.8 million and $6.1 million respectively.

The appellate court’s opinion in this case is so well-researched that I cannot help but include large blocks of text, starting with its introduction to the subject:

The Internal Revenue Code allows a business to deduct from its taxable income a “reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered,”[or] “payments purely for services.” Occasionally the Internal Revenue Service challenges the deduction of a corporate salary on the ground that it’s really a dividend. A dividend, like salary, is taxable to the recipient, but unlike salary is not deductible from the corporation’s taxable income. So by treating a dividend as salary, a corporation can reduce its income tax liability without increasing the income tax of the recipient. . . As a result of a change in law in 2003, dividends are now taxed at a lower maximum rate than salaries—15 percent, versus 35 percent for salary. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11). This makes the tradeoff more complex; although the corporation avoids tax by treating the dividend as a salary, which is deductible, the employee pays a higher tax. But depending on its tax bracket, the corporation may still save more in tax than the employee pays, and in that event, if the employee owns stock in the corporation, he may, depending on how much of the stock he owns, prefer dividends to be treated as salary. . . . Even before the change in the Internal Revenue Code, treating a dividend as salary was less likely to be attempted in a publicly held corporation, because if the CEO or other officers or employees receive dividends called salary beyond what they are entitled to by virtue of owning stock in the corporation, the other shareholders suffer. But in a closely held corporation, the owners might decide to take their dividends in the form of salary in order to beat the corporate income tax, and there would be no one to complain—except the Internal Revenue Service.

The usual case for forbidding the reclassification (for tax purposes) of dividends as salary is thus that “of a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom draw salaries,” Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1), especially if the corporation does not pay dividends (as such) and some of the shareholders do no work for the corporation but merely cash a “salary” check. A difficult case—which is this case—is thus that of a corporation that pays a high salary to its CEO who works full time but is also the controlling shareholder. The Treasury regulation defines a “reasonable” salary as the amount that “would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances,” § 1.162-7(b)(3), but that is not an operational standard. No two enterprises are alike and no two chief executive officers are alike, and anyway the comparison should be between the total compensation package of the CEOs being compared, and that requires consideration of deferred compensation, including severance packages, the amount of risk in the executives’ compensation, and perks.

Courts have attempted to operationalize the Treasury’s standard by considering multiple factors that relate to optimal compensation. [Citations omitted.] We reviewed a number of these attempts in Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir.1999), and concluded that they were too vague, and too difficult to operationalize, to be of much utility. Multifactor tests with no weight assigned to any factor are bad enough from the standpoint of providing an objective basis for a judicial decision [citations omitted]; multifactor tests when none of the factors is concrete are worse, and that is the character of most of the multifactor tests of excessive compensation. . . . All businesses are different, all CEOs are different, and all compensation packages for CEOs are different.

In Exacto, in an effort to bring a modicum of objectivity to the determination of whether a corporate owner/employee’s compensation is “reasonable,” we created the presumption that “when . . . the investors in his company are obtaining a far higher return than they had any reason to expect, [the owner/employee’s] salary is presumptively reasonable.” But we added that the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the company’s success was the result of extraneous factors, such as an unexpected discovery of oil under the company’s land, or that the company intended to pay the owner/employee a disguised dividend rather than salary. 196 F.3d at 839.

The strongest ground for rebuttal, which brings us back to the basic purpose of disallowing “unreasonable” compensation, is that the employee does no work for the corporation; he is merely a shareholder. [Citations omitted.] Comparison with the compensation of executives of other companies can be helpful if—but it is a big if—the comparison takes into account the details of the compensation package of each of the compared executives, and not just the bottom-line salary. This qualification will turn out to be critical in this case.

Having explained the context of this case, the Circuit Court next explained why the Tax Court’s analysis was wrong, especially its comparison of John Menard’s salary to the salaries earned by the Home Depot and Lowe’s CEOs in that year. The appellate court first rejected the notion that the taxpayer’s $17 million bonus, which was equal to 5% of the company’s net income before taxes, was more likely to be a dividend than salary because it was paid at year’s end; was approved by a board that the CEO controlled without outside directors; must be returned if the IRS should disallow the company’s tax deduction as salary; and exceeded the salaries earned by the CEOs of publicly-traded competitors (Home Depot and Lowe’s). The appellate court noted that the managers of privately-held companies often face greater risk than public companies, warranting greater reward for success:

Of particular importance to this case is the amount of risk in the compensation structure. Risk in corporate compensation is significant in two respects. First, most people are risk averse, and the scholarly literature on corporate compensation suggests that risk aversion is actually an obstacle to efficient corporate management because managers tend to be more risk averse than shareholders. Shareholders can diversify the risk of a particular company by owning a diversified portfolio, but a manager tends to have most of his financial, reputational, and “specific human” capital tied up in his job. [Citations omitted.] So the riskier the compensation structure, other things being equal, the higher the executive’s salary must be to compensate him for bearing the additional risk.

That is not a critical consideration in this case because, as we said, management and ownership in Menards are not divorced. But a second significance of risk in a compensation structure is fully applicable to this case. A risky compensation structure implies that the executive’s salary is likely to vary substantially from year to year—high when the company has a good year, low when it has a bad one. Mr. Menard’s average annual income may thus have been considerably less than $20 million—a possibility the Tax Court ignored. Had the corporation lost money in 1998, Menard’s total compensation would have been only $157,500—less than the salary of a federal judge—even if the loss had not been his fault. The 5 percent bonus plan was in effect for a quarter of a century before the IRS pounced; was it just waiting for Menard to have such a great year that the IRS would
have a great-looking case?

The appellate court also noted that the Tax Court had not considered the total compensation packages of the CEOs from the public companies, such as equity compensation, severance packages, retirement plans, and perks. The appellate court noted that the CEO of Home Depot, whose salary was used as a benchmark, actually earned $124 million over six years, and a $210 million severance package when he was forced out. The Court of Appeals also noted that the Tax Court had not considered the salaries of other senior managers, both of Menards and of the benchmark public companies, which may have indicated that this CEO was more productive and delegated less than average. The Court observed that John Menard worked 14 to 16 hours per day, six to seven days per week.

The Seventh Circuit adopted a skeptical, even sarcastic, tone toward the Tax Court’s remark that the owner of a business has no need for incentive compensation because ownership is incentive enough. The Court of Appeals held that owners should not be treated differently from other managers.

Having concluded that John Menard’s $20 million salary was not excessive, the Court of Appeals reversed.