family court

In Balicki v. Balicki, 2010 PA Super. 134 (July 30, 2010), the Superior Court considered the husband’s argument that the alimony order provided more income to his ex-wife than she could spend (as shown by her budgetary expenses). The trial court in its opinion justified the alimony award by noting that the wife would pay income tax on her alimony award, thereby reducing the after-tax dollars available to her. The trial court presented a seemingly reverse-engineered analysis of available income sources to prove that the income nearly matched wife’s claimed budgetary needs, thereby vindicating the result.

An important element of the trial court’s opinion was its calculation of the ex-wife’s income tax liability arising from her alimony award. The trial court held, and the Superior Court agreed, that a tax “gross-up” may be warranted under 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(15), one of the 17 statutory criteria for judging alimony claims. The trial court’s tax gross-up was triple the provision recommended by the master, but the trial court also disapproved the master’s inflated budget. These two adjustments offset each other, and the trial court affirmed the result reached by the master on different grounds.

The husband argued that the trial court had no right to reconsider the tax gross-up since neither party raised the issue in their exceptions from the master’s report. The Superior Court agreed that the trial court was not limited to the issues specifically raised on exceptions. Ironically, the Superior Court dismissed all of the husband’s allegations of error pertaining to specific items on wife’s budget, holding that they were waived because they were not specifically identified in the § 1925 statement.

All of the ex-wife’s issues on appeal, most of which seemed to be calculated to counter-balance husband’s appeals, were dismissed by the Superior Court, which affirmed the rationale of the trial court.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled recently that agreements between spouses who plan to continue their marriage but wish to define their legal rights and obligations in the event of divorce are enforceable in that state. Some states (notably Ohio) do not permit spouses to execute agreements waiving their marital rights unless they are actually pursuing divorce, and the law of many states is unsettled. In its recent decision, the highest court of Massachusetts joined the ranks of states (including Pennsylvania) where such “post-nuptial” agreements are permissible.

Post-nuptial agreements may combine certain elements of prenuptial agreements with features of marital settlement agreements. Post-nuptial agreements may divide marital property between spouses, protect their separate property, and establish or restrict spousal support and alimony, like settlement agreements. Post-nuptial agreements can also protect family businesses, inheritance, and other separate property to be acquired in the future, just as prenuptial agreements do.

In Ansin v. Ansin-Cravin, 457 Mass. 283, 929 N.E.2d 955 (2010), the husband and wife entered into a post-nuptial agreement two years before their eventual divorce. The post-nuptial agreement in that case gave the parties a chance to attempt marital reconciliation while removing the financial risk of taking “one last chance”. The couple had been married for nineteen years at the time of their agreement. At that point, the husband separated from his wife and advised her that he would not return unless she would sign an agreement. She hired legal counsel, investigated the nature and value of their assets, and negotiated the terms of the agreement.

Having signed the agreement, the husband and wife reconciled for nearly two years. Ultimately the reconciliation did not last, but the parties were able to avoid the stress and expense of protracted divorce litigation by having an agreement in place (at least, they would have avoid those pitfalls if the wife had not challenged the validity of the agreement). The Massachusetts court applied the same standards to post-nuptial agreements as many states employ when judging the validity of prenuptial agreements and settlement agreements: (1) availability of independent legal counsel; (2) full and fair disclosure of financial resources; (3) absence of fraud or duress; and (4) reasonableness of the provisions for each spouse.

Pennsylvania has long recognized post-nuptial agreements, and for good reason. When entering into a post-nuptial agreement, full and fair disclosure is an essential element; and it may be important to engage legal counsel. While formbooks and software programs may contain “boilerplate” prenuptial agreements, post-nuptial agreements are very different and require the skill of an experienced family law attorney.

The Colorado Supreme Court, in Marriage of Thornhill (June 1, 2010), held that it would not mandate the “fair value” standard for valuation of business in divorce proceedings. The husband in Thornhill operated an oil and gas service company that was valued at $1.625 million after applying a 33% marketability discount as part of an FMV valuation for divorce purposes. The wife argued on appeal that the marketability discount should not be applied, citing a Colorado precedent in which marketability discounts were prohibited in minority shareholder oppression cases. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to prohibit marketability discounts in divorce cases. The Supreme Court noted that the “fair value” standard was required under the state’s shareholder oppression statute but not under the state’s divorce statute.

This decision contains a good explanation of the reasons why “fair value” is not necessarily appropriate to divorce cases. The wife argued that divorce cases are similar to shareholder oppression cases because a divorce involves an involuntary divestiture of a party’s interest in the business. The Colorado Supreme Court explained that valuation discounts are prohibited in shareholder oppression cases to discourage majority shareholders from engaging in oppressive behavior. In other words, the prohibition of marketability discounts in shareholder oppression cases forces the majority shareholders to pay more than fair market value as a penalty for their conduct. Imposing the fair value standard in divorce cases would not serve the same purpose.

The Colorado Supreme Court did not go as far as prohibiting the fair value standard in divorce cases. Instead, the court held that marketability discounts must be considered on a case-by-case basis. It is conceivable, under certain circumstances, that marketability discounts might not be applied in divorce cases. It would not be appropriate, however, to impose the fair value standard in every divorce.

Texas has once again proven itself to be a haven for the affluent divorcee. In Mandell v. Mandell, 2010 WL 1006406 (March 18, 2010), the Texas Court of Appeals held that a professional spouse’s 25% interest in a medical corporation was limited under the terms of a buy-sell agreement to a nominal fixed price payable to shareholders upon divorce. The decision was summarized at BVLaw Blog as follows:

In a case of first impression, the Texas Court of Appeals considered a buy-sell agreement that purported to bind shareholders and their spouses in the event of divorce. As a further complication, the husband had signed an employment agreement with the private medical association—but neither he nor his wife had signed the shareholders’ agreement.  This unsigned agreement limited the value of a divorcing shareholder’s interest to the equity buy-in price (in this instance, a mere $11,000 for a 25% share in a business with an estimated $3 million to $5 million book value).

I share BVLaw Blog’s incredulity, but my analysis is somewhat different.

In the opinion, the Texas appeals court emphasized that the doctor, who signed the stock purchase agreement during the marriage three years before separation, tendered a check for his buy-in but never signed the shareholders agreement (which was referenced in the stock purchase agreement); and his shares were never issued. After separation, the corporation returned the shareholder’s fixed buy-in payment. At that point, the trial court  might have held that the shares were never acquired, and only the buy-in payment itself was community property.

Yet, during the pendency of the divorce litigation, the wife filed motions compelling her husband and the corporation to complete the transaction. The doctor returned the fixed sum to the corporation, and the corporation issued the shares. When the wife attempted to introduce expert testimony to prove the fair market value of the shares, she was met with a motion in limine, which was granted. The trial court held that the wife was bound by the terms of the agreements.

In Texas, the fair market value of a business is presumed to be zero if the shareholders are contractually obligated to sell back their shares upon retirement, death or divorce. A divorcing spouse may present evidence of book value or comparable sales to rebut the presumption, but in this case, the court held that the net asset value was the property of the corporation, not the shareholders.

It might be signficant that Texas is a community property jurisdiction. Since the marital community exists throughout the marriage in those jurisdictions, it could be said that the doctor’s wife was in privity with her contracting husband when he signed the stock purchase agreement. Furthermore, property in Texas apparently cannot be owned simultaneously by one legal entity (a corporation) and another legal entity (the marital community). These principles might not apply in common law (marital property) states, such as Pennsylvania, where it might be argued that the spouses were neither in privity nor intended third party beneficiaries of such contracts, and where marital property is merely a fictitious estate rather than a legal entity.

A decision issued two weeks ago makes South Carolina the latest state to overturn its laws granting child support to college students. In Webb v. Sowell (April 19, 2010), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the law could not treat separated or divorced parents differently than married parents, who have no legal obligation to pay their children’s college tuition. Such laws, it held, violate the equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions, and no rational basis exists for treating divorced or separated parents differently. This decision, from which two justices dissented, struck down more than thirty years of law in South Carolina.

Nearly twenty years ago, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Blue v. Blue, 432 Pa. 521, 616 A.2d 628 (1992). Interestingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had never touched the issue before Blue, even though trial and appellate courts had been awarding college support in Pennsylvania since 1963. South Carolina’s top court, on the other hand, had granted college support in 1979, reversing itself this year.

Legislative efforts in Pennsylvania following Blue resulted in a statute granting college support to the children of separated and divorced parents. The Pennsylvania Legislature made findings that the children of separated and divorced parents have special needs and circumstances which justify a different treatment than the children of intact families. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed, striking down the law in Curtis vs. Kline, 542 Pa. 249, 666 A.2d 265 (1995). The law remains on the books but has no legal effect due to the Curtis decision.

In Murphy v. Murphy, a recent Superior Court decision, the father appealed a support order entered in absentia because he claimed that he never received notice of the June 2008 support hearing. The father argued that the notice mailed to him was too late (less than 20 days before the hearing, contrary to Rule 1910.6) and was not adequately proven to have been mailed at all, since the only evidence was the notation “Service Type M” on the scheduling order.

For her part, the mother argued that the father’s appeal was untimely. Father did not appeal the resulting support order, claiming that he never knew of the hearing and was not served with the support order. Instead he filed a Motion to Relist Hearing approximately 39 days after the hearing, on which the trial court did not rule for six months. Father eventually appealed the December 2008 order denying his Motion to Relist, but solely pertaining to the court’s alleged failure to serve notice of the June 2008 hearing. The Superior Court held that the appeal should have been taken from the June 2008 hearing, and that the trial court lost its jurisdiction to act upon the Motion to Relist because it was untimely under 42 Pa.C.S. 5505 (30 day limit on modification or rescission of court orders).

An interesting side note: in Murphy, the trial court imputed an earning capacity for father based upon tax documents issued to the father years ago. The father failed to appear at several hearings or produce evidence of his income, so the trial court felt free to make adverse inferences.

In the recent Superior Court decision, Castadi v. Castaldi, the Domestic Relations Section mailed notices to the child’s mother inquiring whether child support should terminate in January 2007, when the child would be eighteen years old. Mother did not respond to the inquiries, and the Domestic Relations Section terminated child support. Unbeknownst to the DRS, the child had not yet completed 12th grade.

In the summer in 2007, the mother contacted DRS and notified them that the child had not graduated high school until June 2007. The DRS administratively amended the support arrears, adding an additional 6 months of arrears for which the father was responsible. The father filed a petition seeking to rescind the additional arrears, which was denied by the trial court. The Superior Court affirmed.

In its opinion, the Superior Court first confirmed that the child support order should have continued until the later of the child’s 18th birthday or high school graduation. The Court distinguished Style v. Shaub, in which the DRS administratively terminated child support after the child had turned 18 and graduated from high school. The Court held that DRS had continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Section 4352(e) to amend the arrears and was authorized to correct its error in terminating child support prematurely. The Court held that the mother was not estopped by failing to respond to the DRS inquiries.

Two articles from BV Wire recently caught my attention. Both deal with business valuation in divorce cases where personal goodwill was an issue. I will post my own analysis soon. Meanwhile, here are excerpts from BV Wire’s blast email, published by BV Resources.

Med practice valuations still plague appraisers—and the courts

A trio of new divorce cases highlights the constant challenge of appraising medical practices, everything from doctors who won’t disclose their finances to those who insist their opinions should determine value. In Garcia v. Garcia (Fla. App., Jan. 20, 2010), the husband’s expert argued for a strict application of the buy-sell agreement, which would have limited his share in a successful hematology practice to a mere $45,000—compared to the wife’s expert, who used a net asset value to appraise it at $900,000. At the very least, the husband argued, the restrictive buy-sell should considerably discount the NAV (but he lost both arguments on appeal).

Or consider Amaraneni v. Amaraneni, (La. App., Feb. 12, 2010), in which the doctor claimed his interest in an urgent care clinic had no value apart from goodwill attributable to his professional qualities. But he failed to provide any financial documentation to the court-appointed expert; at deposition, he was similarly “vague” and un-responsive. His name was on the wall but the clinic wasn’t named after him. A manager supervised all the operations and staff—and the expert apportioned all goodwill to the enterprise, also confirmed on appeal.

Finally, in Dickert v.Dickert, (S.C., Jan. 11, 2010), the trial court valued the husband’s successful dental practice at $360,000, including over $255,000 of “enterprise goodwill.” In an expedited appeal to the S.C. Supreme Court, the husband argued that state law precluded any consideration of goodwill in a professional practice, due to its speculative nature. The wife claimed the current majority rule on enterprise values was the better law, but the court disagreed, finding the goodwill asset “too intangible” to support an accurate valuation.  (All three case digests will appear in the April 2010 Business Valuation Update™.)

Is this recession enough reason to devalue assets in divorce?

In Mistretta v.Mistretta (Fla. App., Feb. 18, 2010), the trial court valued the husband’s restaurant at $854,000, based on a valuation report prepared nearly a year earlier. The husband moved for reconsideration, claiming the recession caused the restaurant to lose value. The trial court agreed, finding that no one could have foreseen the severity of the economic crisis—but the wife successfully appealed. “Economic recessions, like other vagaries in the business cycle, are contingencies appraisers must take into account in valuing a business,” the appellate court held, despite a strong dissent which likened the recession to a global economic “tsunami.” The wife’s expert, Gary Trugman, obviously agrees with the majority. “The truth is, we did consider the economic downturn, because we used dual valuation dates,” he tells the BVWire™. The husband also lost on his expert’s claim that 50% of the restaurant’s value was personal goodwill. “As I said to the judge, ‘Your Honor, when was the last time you went to a restaurant if the food was lousy, the service was terrible, but the owner was a really nice guy?’ I think that got my point across, that there was very little personal goodwill,” Trugman says. “I used Pratt’s Stats data for restaurants to demonstrate what portion of the purchase price was protected by a covenant not to compete, and used that percentage to allocate some personal goodwill—but it was a relatively small figure.”

An issue that befuddles some business owners during the course of their divorce litigation is how to regulate the operation and management of their businesses. In cases where both spouses own interests in the business, they may struggle for control of important business and financial decisions.

Some issues may be resolved under the company’s partnership agreement, shareholders’ agreement, limited liability company (LLC) agreement, or corporate by-laws. Yet, these agreements are often too vague to deal effectively with disputes between divorcing spouses who own businesses together.

Early in the evolution of the Divorce Code, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania authorized the Courts to appoint receivers or trustees to prevent the dissipation of an ongoing business concern. Mayhue v. Mayhue, 485 A.2d 494 (Pa.Super.1984). The Superior Court in Mayhue held that 23 Pa.C.S. § 3505(a) and 23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(f) authorized the Courts to enter an injunction to prevent a spouse from continuing a course of conduct calculated to defeat his wife’s property rights in the business. The Superior Court in Mayhue approved the trustee’s powers to liquidate assets to pay business debts, pay delinquent taxes, and satisfy intercompany debts.

The appointment of a receiver is not practical in every case because the expense of paying a receiver may not be justified. Still, there are some cases in which third party supervision of the business might be the only practical way t0 ensure continued smooth operation of a business caught in the middle.

For each of the past four years, I have been privileged to teach lawyers about the latest developments in child support as one of the hosts of Family Law Update, a satellite broadcast presentation sponsored by the Pennsyvlania Bar Institute. Since I joined the panel in 2005, several important decisions have influenced the direction of Pennsylvania child support law. Here is my summary of the six most important cases (and one change in the law itself) since 2005:

#6 – Reinert v. Reinert, 926 A.2d 539 (Pa.Super.2007). The Superior Court in this case affirmed the continuing viability of the “nurturing parent doctrine,” a policy in which the courts may excuse the mother of a young child from working to contribute toward the support of the child. Prior to this decision, it was established that a mother may refrain from working even to raise the child of a subsequent relationship. Yet, in Reinert, the Superior Court took the policy to its extreme. The Court terminated the support obligation of a mother who did not have custody of her eldest child when she gave birth to twins by a subsequent relationship and elected to stay at home to raise them.

#5 – Murphy v. McDermott, 2009 WL 2365992 (2009). The question of whether a parent must pay private school tuition may be raised in child support proceedings, but it is also a legal custody issue. The problem is: the legal standards to answer that question are different in support and custody proceedings. The Murphy case demonstrates how important “status quo” can be, compelling a parent to pay tuition even if he or she objected at the time when the child was enrolled in private or parochial school. The lesson: parents must get involved in the choice of schooling before the question of paying comes up.

#4 – Berry v. Berry, 2006 Pa.Super. 98 (2006). When child support becomes an issue between divorcing parents, the courts must decide whether certain income sources – such as pensions, rental properties and businesses – should be considered as marital property or income for support purposes. Generally, they cannot be both. In Berry, the Superior Court held that severance pay would be counted as marital property if acquired before separation or income if acquired after separation.

#3 – Estate of Johnson, 970 A.2d 433 (Pa.Super.2009). While this decision might be limited to its unique factual circumstances, the Superior Court certainly affected settlement practice by holding the estate of a deceased parent responsible for the payment of child support. The deceased parent had entered into a marital settlement agreement with his ex-wife, promising to pay child support until the youngest child was 18 years of age. The agreement did not specify whether the obligation would terminate upon the death of a parent, so the court held that it did not. The estate ended up owing nothing, however, because the Social Security derivative benefits received by the child as a result of the parent’s death satisfied the child support obligation. This case has prompted many lawyers to specify death as cause for terminating child support in their agreements, and has also motivated support recipients to demand life insurance as a security device.

#2 – Krebs v. Krebs, 944 A.2d 487 (Pa.Super.2008). The Superior Court fortified its prior admonitions warning support payors to report increases in their income. In cases where a payor fails to report an increase, even an increase not precipitated by a job promotion or change in employers, the court may increase child support retroactively to the date when the income increase occurred, even years later. The Superior Court in Krebs granted such a retroactive increase in child support even after the custodial parent

#1 – The 2010 Amendments to the Pennsylvania Child Support Guidelines. The 2010 amendments eliminated the Melzer formula, which was a budget-based method of calculating child support in high-income cases. The uppermost limits of the child support guidelines have been extended to $30,000 per month combined net income, and an income-based formula has been promulgated to calculate child support in high-income cases.