decisions

In Balicki v. Balicki, 2010 PA Super. 134 (July 30, 2010), the Superior Court considered the husband’s argument that the alimony order provided more income to his ex-wife than she could spend (as shown by her budgetary expenses). The trial court in its opinion justified the alimony award by noting that the wife would pay income tax on her alimony award, thereby reducing the after-tax dollars available to her. The trial court presented a seemingly reverse-engineered analysis of available income sources to prove that the income nearly matched wife’s claimed budgetary needs, thereby vindicating the result.

An important element of the trial court’s opinion was its calculation of the ex-wife’s income tax liability arising from her alimony award. The trial court held, and the Superior Court agreed, that a tax “gross-up” may be warranted under 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(15), one of the 17 statutory criteria for judging alimony claims. The trial court’s tax gross-up was triple the provision recommended by the master, but the trial court also disapproved the master’s inflated budget. These two adjustments offset each other, and the trial court affirmed the result reached by the master on different grounds.

The husband argued that the trial court had no right to reconsider the tax gross-up since neither party raised the issue in their exceptions from the master’s report. The Superior Court agreed that the trial court was not limited to the issues specifically raised on exceptions. Ironically, the Superior Court dismissed all of the husband’s allegations of error pertaining to specific items on wife’s budget, holding that they were waived because they were not specifically identified in the § 1925 statement.

All of the ex-wife’s issues on appeal, most of which seemed to be calculated to counter-balance husband’s appeals, were dismissed by the Superior Court, which affirmed the rationale of the trial court.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled recently that agreements between spouses who plan to continue their marriage but wish to define their legal rights and obligations in the event of divorce are enforceable in that state. Some states (notably Ohio) do not permit spouses to execute agreements waiving their marital rights unless they are actually pursuing divorce, and the law of many states is unsettled. In its recent decision, the highest court of Massachusetts joined the ranks of states (including Pennsylvania) where such “post-nuptial” agreements are permissible.

Post-nuptial agreements may combine certain elements of prenuptial agreements with features of marital settlement agreements. Post-nuptial agreements may divide marital property between spouses, protect their separate property, and establish or restrict spousal support and alimony, like settlement agreements. Post-nuptial agreements can also protect family businesses, inheritance, and other separate property to be acquired in the future, just as prenuptial agreements do.

In Ansin v. Ansin-Cravin, 457 Mass. 283, 929 N.E.2d 955 (2010), the husband and wife entered into a post-nuptial agreement two years before their eventual divorce. The post-nuptial agreement in that case gave the parties a chance to attempt marital reconciliation while removing the financial risk of taking “one last chance”. The couple had been married for nineteen years at the time of their agreement. At that point, the husband separated from his wife and advised her that he would not return unless she would sign an agreement. She hired legal counsel, investigated the nature and value of their assets, and negotiated the terms of the agreement.

Having signed the agreement, the husband and wife reconciled for nearly two years. Ultimately the reconciliation did not last, but the parties were able to avoid the stress and expense of protracted divorce litigation by having an agreement in place (at least, they would have avoid those pitfalls if the wife had not challenged the validity of the agreement). The Massachusetts court applied the same standards to post-nuptial agreements as many states employ when judging the validity of prenuptial agreements and settlement agreements: (1) availability of independent legal counsel; (2) full and fair disclosure of financial resources; (3) absence of fraud or duress; and (4) reasonableness of the provisions for each spouse.

Pennsylvania has long recognized post-nuptial agreements, and for good reason. When entering into a post-nuptial agreement, full and fair disclosure is an essential element; and it may be important to engage legal counsel. While formbooks and software programs may contain “boilerplate” prenuptial agreements, post-nuptial agreements are very different and require the skill of an experienced family law attorney.

The Colorado Supreme Court, in Marriage of Thornhill (June 1, 2010), held that it would not mandate the “fair value” standard for valuation of business in divorce proceedings. The husband in Thornhill operated an oil and gas service company that was valued at $1.625 million after applying a 33% marketability discount as part of an FMV valuation for divorce purposes. The wife argued on appeal that the marketability discount should not be applied, citing a Colorado precedent in which marketability discounts were prohibited in minority shareholder oppression cases. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to prohibit marketability discounts in divorce cases. The Supreme Court noted that the “fair value” standard was required under the state’s shareholder oppression statute but not under the state’s divorce statute.

This decision contains a good explanation of the reasons why “fair value” is not necessarily appropriate to divorce cases. The wife argued that divorce cases are similar to shareholder oppression cases because a divorce involves an involuntary divestiture of a party’s interest in the business. The Colorado Supreme Court explained that valuation discounts are prohibited in shareholder oppression cases to discourage majority shareholders from engaging in oppressive behavior. In other words, the prohibition of marketability discounts in shareholder oppression cases forces the majority shareholders to pay more than fair market value as a penalty for their conduct. Imposing the fair value standard in divorce cases would not serve the same purpose.

The Colorado Supreme Court did not go as far as prohibiting the fair value standard in divorce cases. Instead, the court held that marketability discounts must be considered on a case-by-case basis. It is conceivable, under certain circumstances, that marketability discounts might not be applied in divorce cases. It would not be appropriate, however, to impose the fair value standard in every divorce.

Yesterday, I posted a summary of Abbott v. Abbott, 530 U.S. ___ (May 17, 2010), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Chilean non-relocation order was a “right of custody” under the Hague Convention, requiring the Texas court to return a child to Chile after the mother relocated to Texas without permission. The Abbott decision was an opinion of the majority, including six of the nine Justices. Only Justice Stevens dissented, with Thomas and Breyer, JJ, joining him. This post will look at the dissenting opinion.

In his dissent, Justice Stevens described the difference between “rights of custody” and “rights of access” under the Hague Convention. If a parent’s “rights of custody” are violated, the courts must return the child to the jurisdiction that granted those custody rights. On the other hand, if a parent’s “rights of access” are violated, there is no duty to return the child. Justice Stevens argued that under Chilean law, the father in this case did not have what we would call “joint legal custody”; that is, the right to participate in major decisions concerning the child’s health, education, upbringing and religious training. The non-relocation order was merely a restriction on the mother’s custody rights, not “rights of custody” that would justify the more stringent remedy under the Hague Convention. Since the father did not have any rights or responsibilities to provide for the child’s care, the Justice argued, he should not have been able to interfere so deeply with the mother’s custody rights.

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling on Monday in an international custody case governed by the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of  International Child Abduction. In Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. ___ (May 17, 2010), the mother and father of a child who was born in the United States moved to Chile. When the parents separated, a Chilean court awarded primary custody to the mother and visitation to the father. Under Chilean law, a visitation order includes the right to prohibit the mother from taking the child out of Chile without the permission of the court or the father. The mother took the child to Texas without permission, prompting the father to sue in federal court under the Hague Convention. The Texas court held that it did not have jurisdiction under the Hague Convention because the father had no “rights of custody” under the Chilean court orders. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the father’s right to prevent the mother from taking the child out of Chile amounted to “rights of custody” under the Hague Convention. In other words, the father’s right to deny relocation, which was implicit in the Chilean court’s visitiation order, was sufficient to invoke the protections of the Hague Convention.

The Hague Convention contains a definition of “rights of custody” which includes the right to determine a child’s place of residence. An order or law that prohibits a parent from removing the child from the court’s jurisdiction imposes a duty on a parent that is a right in the other parent. This right to veto the departure of a child is a “right of custody” under the Hague Convention. This Supreme Court decision overturned decisions made in the Fifth Circuit, Second Circuit, Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit.

The Jon and Kate divorce provided another example this week of what to do – and what not to do – in divorce situations. The Gosselins were ordered this week to attend mandatory co-parenting classes in Berks County.  Allegheny County and most surrounding counties in Western Pennsylvania have a similar program. In Allegheny County, it is known as the “Generations” program.

The Generations program, part of the Child Custody Department, is a mandatory two-part process for individuals involved in a custody dispute. This alternative dispute resolution program includes an educational seminar for adults, an interactive group for children ages six through fifteen, and a mediation orientation session.

The adult education seminar of the Generations program is approximately three hours in length and offers parents/caregivers the skills to reach their own resolution on custody issues. The following topics are addressed:

• How to build a co-parenting relationship
• How to communicate and problem-solve
• How to help children cope effectively with their changing family
• Identify how parent/caregiver conflict can affect the behavior of children
• Understand that most children do best when they have the opportunity to know and love both parents
• General overview of the mediation session

The children’s group serves children between the ages of six and fifteen years old. Children are appropriately grouped by age so that they can identify and share with peers similar experiences in their families. These groups are facilitated with activities, discussions, art, music and play.

Later in the week, after being ordered to attend parenting classes, Jon Gosselin was spotted in a mall bookstore, reviewing a copy of Kate Gosselin’s latest book, “I Just Want You to Know: Letters to My Kids on Love, Faith and Family.” Perhaps he was looking for dirt to use against Kate in the mediation.

I generally advise clients not to go to the Generations mediation with a chip on their shoulders. It is really not productive to enter mediation with a laundry list of “wrongs” perpetrated by the other parent. It does not impress the mediator. Remember that even if the other parent confesses to a murder during the mediation, the mediator cannot be called to testify. Concentrate instead on telling the mediator what custody arrangements you want, focusing on how your plan will benefit the children. If you keep your focus on the kids and why your proposal is best for them, you are much more likely to get good results.

Texas has once again proven itself to be a haven for the affluent divorcee. In Mandell v. Mandell, 2010 WL 1006406 (March 18, 2010), the Texas Court of Appeals held that a professional spouse’s 25% interest in a medical corporation was limited under the terms of a buy-sell agreement to a nominal fixed price payable to shareholders upon divorce. The decision was summarized at BVLaw Blog as follows:

In a case of first impression, the Texas Court of Appeals considered a buy-sell agreement that purported to bind shareholders and their spouses in the event of divorce. As a further complication, the husband had signed an employment agreement with the private medical association—but neither he nor his wife had signed the shareholders’ agreement.  This unsigned agreement limited the value of a divorcing shareholder’s interest to the equity buy-in price (in this instance, a mere $11,000 for a 25% share in a business with an estimated $3 million to $5 million book value).

I share BVLaw Blog’s incredulity, but my analysis is somewhat different.

In the opinion, the Texas appeals court emphasized that the doctor, who signed the stock purchase agreement during the marriage three years before separation, tendered a check for his buy-in but never signed the shareholders agreement (which was referenced in the stock purchase agreement); and his shares were never issued. After separation, the corporation returned the shareholder’s fixed buy-in payment. At that point, the trial court  might have held that the shares were never acquired, and only the buy-in payment itself was community property.

Yet, during the pendency of the divorce litigation, the wife filed motions compelling her husband and the corporation to complete the transaction. The doctor returned the fixed sum to the corporation, and the corporation issued the shares. When the wife attempted to introduce expert testimony to prove the fair market value of the shares, she was met with a motion in limine, which was granted. The trial court held that the wife was bound by the terms of the agreements.

In Texas, the fair market value of a business is presumed to be zero if the shareholders are contractually obligated to sell back their shares upon retirement, death or divorce. A divorcing spouse may present evidence of book value or comparable sales to rebut the presumption, but in this case, the court held that the net asset value was the property of the corporation, not the shareholders.

It might be signficant that Texas is a community property jurisdiction. Since the marital community exists throughout the marriage in those jurisdictions, it could be said that the doctor’s wife was in privity with her contracting husband when he signed the stock purchase agreement. Furthermore, property in Texas apparently cannot be owned simultaneously by one legal entity (a corporation) and another legal entity (the marital community). These principles might not apply in common law (marital property) states, such as Pennsylvania, where it might be argued that the spouses were neither in privity nor intended third party beneficiaries of such contracts, and where marital property is merely a fictitious estate rather than a legal entity.

A decision issued two weeks ago makes South Carolina the latest state to overturn its laws granting child support to college students. In Webb v. Sowell (April 19, 2010), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the law could not treat separated or divorced parents differently than married parents, who have no legal obligation to pay their children’s college tuition. Such laws, it held, violate the equal protection clause of the federal and state constitutions, and no rational basis exists for treating divorced or separated parents differently. This decision, from which two justices dissented, struck down more than thirty years of law in South Carolina.

Nearly twenty years ago, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Blue v. Blue, 432 Pa. 521, 616 A.2d 628 (1992). Interestingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had never touched the issue before Blue, even though trial and appellate courts had been awarding college support in Pennsylvania since 1963. South Carolina’s top court, on the other hand, had granted college support in 1979, reversing itself this year.

Legislative efforts in Pennsylvania following Blue resulted in a statute granting college support to the children of separated and divorced parents. The Pennsylvania Legislature made findings that the children of separated and divorced parents have special needs and circumstances which justify a different treatment than the children of intact families. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed, striking down the law in Curtis vs. Kline, 542 Pa. 249, 666 A.2d 265 (1995). The law remains on the books but has no legal effect due to the Curtis decision.

In Murphy v. Murphy, a recent Superior Court decision, the father appealed a support order entered in absentia because he claimed that he never received notice of the June 2008 support hearing. The father argued that the notice mailed to him was too late (less than 20 days before the hearing, contrary to Rule 1910.6) and was not adequately proven to have been mailed at all, since the only evidence was the notation “Service Type M” on the scheduling order.

For her part, the mother argued that the father’s appeal was untimely. Father did not appeal the resulting support order, claiming that he never knew of the hearing and was not served with the support order. Instead he filed a Motion to Relist Hearing approximately 39 days after the hearing, on which the trial court did not rule for six months. Father eventually appealed the December 2008 order denying his Motion to Relist, but solely pertaining to the court’s alleged failure to serve notice of the June 2008 hearing. The Superior Court held that the appeal should have been taken from the June 2008 hearing, and that the trial court lost its jurisdiction to act upon the Motion to Relist because it was untimely under 42 Pa.C.S. 5505 (30 day limit on modification or rescission of court orders).

An interesting side note: in Murphy, the trial court imputed an earning capacity for father based upon tax documents issued to the father years ago. The father failed to appear at several hearings or produce evidence of his income, so the trial court felt free to make adverse inferences.

In the recent Superior Court decision, Castadi v. Castaldi, the Domestic Relations Section mailed notices to the child’s mother inquiring whether child support should terminate in January 2007, when the child would be eighteen years old. Mother did not respond to the inquiries, and the Domestic Relations Section terminated child support. Unbeknownst to the DRS, the child had not yet completed 12th grade.

In the summer in 2007, the mother contacted DRS and notified them that the child had not graduated high school until June 2007. The DRS administratively amended the support arrears, adding an additional 6 months of arrears for which the father was responsible. The father filed a petition seeking to rescind the additional arrears, which was denied by the trial court. The Superior Court affirmed.

In its opinion, the Superior Court first confirmed that the child support order should have continued until the later of the child’s 18th birthday or high school graduation. The Court distinguished Style v. Shaub, in which the DRS administratively terminated child support after the child had turned 18 and graduated from high school. The Court held that DRS had continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Section 4352(e) to amend the arrears and was authorized to correct its error in terminating child support prematurely. The Court held that the mother was not estopped by failing to respond to the DRS inquiries.