business valuation

The Colorado Supreme Court, in Marriage of Thornhill (June 1, 2010), held that it would not mandate the “fair value” standard for valuation of business in divorce proceedings. The husband in Thornhill operated an oil and gas service company that was valued at $1.625 million after applying a 33% marketability discount as part of an FMV valuation for divorce purposes. The wife argued on appeal that the marketability discount should not be applied, citing a Colorado precedent in which marketability discounts were prohibited in minority shareholder oppression cases. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to prohibit marketability discounts in divorce cases. The Supreme Court noted that the “fair value” standard was required under the state’s shareholder oppression statute but not under the state’s divorce statute.

This decision contains a good explanation of the reasons why “fair value” is not necessarily appropriate to divorce cases. The wife argued that divorce cases are similar to shareholder oppression cases because a divorce involves an involuntary divestiture of a party’s interest in the business. The Colorado Supreme Court explained that valuation discounts are prohibited in shareholder oppression cases to discourage majority shareholders from engaging in oppressive behavior. In other words, the prohibition of marketability discounts in shareholder oppression cases forces the majority shareholders to pay more than fair market value as a penalty for their conduct. Imposing the fair value standard in divorce cases would not serve the same purpose.

The Colorado Supreme Court did not go as far as prohibiting the fair value standard in divorce cases. Instead, the court held that marketability discounts must be considered on a case-by-case basis. It is conceivable, under certain circumstances, that marketability discounts might not be applied in divorce cases. It would not be appropriate, however, to impose the fair value standard in every divorce.

Texas has once again proven itself to be a haven for the affluent divorcee. In Mandell v. Mandell, 2010 WL 1006406 (March 18, 2010), the Texas Court of Appeals held that a professional spouse’s 25% interest in a medical corporation was limited under the terms of a buy-sell agreement to a nominal fixed price payable to shareholders upon divorce. The decision was summarized at BVLaw Blog as follows:

In a case of first impression, the Texas Court of Appeals considered a buy-sell agreement that purported to bind shareholders and their spouses in the event of divorce. As a further complication, the husband had signed an employment agreement with the private medical association—but neither he nor his wife had signed the shareholders’ agreement.  This unsigned agreement limited the value of a divorcing shareholder’s interest to the equity buy-in price (in this instance, a mere $11,000 for a 25% share in a business with an estimated $3 million to $5 million book value).

I share BVLaw Blog’s incredulity, but my analysis is somewhat different.

In the opinion, the Texas appeals court emphasized that the doctor, who signed the stock purchase agreement during the marriage three years before separation, tendered a check for his buy-in but never signed the shareholders agreement (which was referenced in the stock purchase agreement); and his shares were never issued. After separation, the corporation returned the shareholder’s fixed buy-in payment. At that point, the trial court  might have held that the shares were never acquired, and only the buy-in payment itself was community property.

Yet, during the pendency of the divorce litigation, the wife filed motions compelling her husband and the corporation to complete the transaction. The doctor returned the fixed sum to the corporation, and the corporation issued the shares. When the wife attempted to introduce expert testimony to prove the fair market value of the shares, she was met with a motion in limine, which was granted. The trial court held that the wife was bound by the terms of the agreements.

In Texas, the fair market value of a business is presumed to be zero if the shareholders are contractually obligated to sell back their shares upon retirement, death or divorce. A divorcing spouse may present evidence of book value or comparable sales to rebut the presumption, but in this case, the court held that the net asset value was the property of the corporation, not the shareholders.

It might be signficant that Texas is a community property jurisdiction. Since the marital community exists throughout the marriage in those jurisdictions, it could be said that the doctor’s wife was in privity with her contracting husband when he signed the stock purchase agreement. Furthermore, property in Texas apparently cannot be owned simultaneously by one legal entity (a corporation) and another legal entity (the marital community). These principles might not apply in common law (marital property) states, such as Pennsylvania, where it might be argued that the spouses were neither in privity nor intended third party beneficiaries of such contracts, and where marital property is merely a fictitious estate rather than a legal entity.

Two articles from BV Wire recently caught my attention. Both deal with business valuation in divorce cases where personal goodwill was an issue. I will post my own analysis soon. Meanwhile, here are excerpts from BV Wire’s blast email, published by BV Resources.

Med practice valuations still plague appraisers—and the courts

A trio of new divorce cases highlights the constant challenge of appraising medical practices, everything from doctors who won’t disclose their finances to those who insist their opinions should determine value. In Garcia v. Garcia (Fla. App., Jan. 20, 2010), the husband’s expert argued for a strict application of the buy-sell agreement, which would have limited his share in a successful hematology practice to a mere $45,000—compared to the wife’s expert, who used a net asset value to appraise it at $900,000. At the very least, the husband argued, the restrictive buy-sell should considerably discount the NAV (but he lost both arguments on appeal).

Or consider Amaraneni v. Amaraneni, (La. App., Feb. 12, 2010), in which the doctor claimed his interest in an urgent care clinic had no value apart from goodwill attributable to his professional qualities. But he failed to provide any financial documentation to the court-appointed expert; at deposition, he was similarly “vague” and un-responsive. His name was on the wall but the clinic wasn’t named after him. A manager supervised all the operations and staff—and the expert apportioned all goodwill to the enterprise, also confirmed on appeal.

Finally, in Dickert v.Dickert, (S.C., Jan. 11, 2010), the trial court valued the husband’s successful dental practice at $360,000, including over $255,000 of “enterprise goodwill.” In an expedited appeal to the S.C. Supreme Court, the husband argued that state law precluded any consideration of goodwill in a professional practice, due to its speculative nature. The wife claimed the current majority rule on enterprise values was the better law, but the court disagreed, finding the goodwill asset “too intangible” to support an accurate valuation.  (All three case digests will appear in the April 2010 Business Valuation Update™.)

Is this recession enough reason to devalue assets in divorce?

In Mistretta v.Mistretta (Fla. App., Feb. 18, 2010), the trial court valued the husband’s restaurant at $854,000, based on a valuation report prepared nearly a year earlier. The husband moved for reconsideration, claiming the recession caused the restaurant to lose value. The trial court agreed, finding that no one could have foreseen the severity of the economic crisis—but the wife successfully appealed. “Economic recessions, like other vagaries in the business cycle, are contingencies appraisers must take into account in valuing a business,” the appellate court held, despite a strong dissent which likened the recession to a global economic “tsunami.” The wife’s expert, Gary Trugman, obviously agrees with the majority. “The truth is, we did consider the economic downturn, because we used dual valuation dates,” he tells the BVWire™. The husband also lost on his expert’s claim that 50% of the restaurant’s value was personal goodwill. “As I said to the judge, ‘Your Honor, when was the last time you went to a restaurant if the food was lousy, the service was terrible, but the owner was a really nice guy?’ I think that got my point across, that there was very little personal goodwill,” Trugman says. “I used Pratt’s Stats data for restaurants to demonstrate what portion of the purchase price was protected by a covenant not to compete, and used that percentage to allocate some personal goodwill—but it was a relatively small figure.”

This weekend I attended the second annual Divorce Summit sponsored by Business Valuation Resources, one of the leading publishers in the bizval field. On Thursday, September 24, 2009, we heard The View from the Bench, giving voice to a group of family law judges from New York, Illinois, Rhode Island, and elsewhere. One of the standouts was the Hon. Edward Jordan, a family law calendar control judge from Cook County, Illinois. His commentary was insightful and pithy, and I was enchanted by the notion of a calendar control judge who could dispatch cases ready for trial to the judges within a few short weeks. 

When the judges had had their say, it was the lawyers’ turn. A panel of AAML divorce lawyers informed the assembly of bizval professionals “What Lawyers Expect from their Financial Experts.”  The breakout sessions on Thursday and Friday were stellar, starting with “Reasonable Compensation in Divorce” by Ron Signeur and Sharyn Maggio. One of the most useful discussions, in my mind, was the itemized lists of criteria that experts and courts may consider when determining reasonable compensation (hint: article forthcoming).

Another of my favorite breakout sessions was Chris Mercer’s and Ashok Abbott’s  seminar on “Active vs. Passive Appreciation.” In most states other than Pennsylvania, the divorce courts distinguish two types of increase in the value of separate assets. Appreciation in value that results from the efforts of a spouse during the marriage are regarded as separate property, while appreciation due to passive factors such as inflation is part of the marital estate. In Pennsylvania, a corollary concept is the Adelstein argument (where a nonmarital asset has experienced a post-separation increase in value). Mercer presented one of the most compelling analyses I have seen on this issue, quantifying the specific dollar amount of passive and active increase based upon the Gordon Growth present value formula. It was brilliant, and in my opinion, just the starting point of an important development in BV technique (hint: another article forthcoming!).

A Friday breakout on “Transmutation and Tracing” was informative and timely, given the proliferation of this concept in divorce litigation. Fact: some litigants in California are commissioning a forensic accounting of their entire marriage to determine whether property was acquired with community funds or separate funds. 

The Thornhill case (in which Colorado refused to adopt a fair value standard in matrimonial litigation) was highlighted in several presentations. I must say this conference was one of the best I have attended in some time.

BVWire.com reported this week on a recent California case where the issue of double dipping was examined in the context of divorcing business owners:

The husband owned a produce company in California, valued at $5.6 million, ostensibly under the capitalization/excess earnings method. After a marriage of “long duration and substantial standard of living,” the trial court awarded the wife $20,000 per month in spousal support plus half ($2.8 million) of the business. The husband appealed, urging a blanket prohibition against double dipping—i.e., using the same stream of earnings to determine business value/property division and also support.

In Blazer v. Blazer (No. DR 38292, Aug. 25, 2009), the California Court of Appeals discusses the excess earnings method and, in particular, the myriad ways to distinguish personal from enterprise goodwill. It also considers the double-dipping precedent from other jurisdictions as well as its own cases concerning pension divisions. In the end, the court sidesteps the issue by finding insufficient proof that the husband’s expert in fact valued the business by capitalizing his future income stream. Moreover, “the earnings of an ongoing business…do not always derive solely from the personal efforts of its operator, nor is there evidence that such is the case here.” The court explicitly confirmed the equity of the spousal award in this case as well as the trial court’s implicit determination that there was no double counting of the husband’s income.

Thus, the question remains open in California and elsewhere—especially for cases concerning owners of a professional firm or solo practice whose interests are valued under the excess earnings method. Look for a full summary of Blazer and our continuing analysis of double dipping in the November Business Valuation Update™.

This weekend I am in Chicago to attend the BVR Divorce Conference. I will read the case and many others while I am there, so I will have much to report about when I return!

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently held that a business owner’s spouse who signed a buy-sell agreement was bound by the value in a divorce action. In Inzer (2009), the husband and wife both signed a buy-sell agreement when they formed an LLC to purchase a Sonic Drive-In franchise. The buy-sell agreement granted other partners a right of first refusal to buy the interests of a withdrawing partner for the lesser of book value or the offer procured by the withdrawing partner. The owner’s expert presented evidence that the owner’s 24% interest in the franchise was worth $120,000 to $135,000 using capitalized cash flow or market methods, but only $16,000 net book value after discounts. Wife’s expert testified to a value of more than $500,000 after making adjustments to the owners’ compensation and ignoring discounts for lack of marketability, lack of control or the restrictive operating agreement.

The trial court valued the owner’s interest at $200,000 without much explanation. The Tennessee Court reversed, holding that the franchise was worth $33,000 book value without consideration of intangible value or discounts (as specified in the buy-sell agreement). The appellate court distinguished cases in which buy-sell agreements were not controlling, since the non-owner spouse in those cases did not sign the buy-sell.

Consider whether it was appropriate for Wife’s expert to perform  Type I adjustments in his normalization of the income statement, i.e., adjusting the owners’ compensation. Could a purchaser of a 24% interest compel the other owners to reduce their compensation? Even if the Court had not held the buy-sell to be controlling, it seems unlikely that Wife’s expert would have prevailed.

In divorce litigation where one of the spouses owns a professional practice, such as a medical practice, dental practice, law firm or accounting firm, the lawyers and their experts have to determine whether the business has value. Their determination depends upon whether the professional practice is believed to have enterprise goodwill.

Briefly, enterprise goodwill is the price that a buyer would pay for a professional practice over and above the value of its hard assets like equipment and supplies. In theoretical terms, enterprise goodwill is the reputation of the business that is not closely associated with a particular owner or professional. The opposite of enterprise goodwill is personal goodwill, which is the reputation and skill of the professional. Enterprise goodwill has value because it is transferrable but personal goodwill is not. Someone might be willing to pay for a name like Aspen Dental Systems, but what about Jane Doe, PC?

Increasingly, there is a market for professional practices that are not part of a regional or national chain. Dental practices, even those with a single location and single dentist, are bought and sold frequently. The same is true for specialty medical practics. Yet, primary care medical practices and legal practices are rarely bought or sold. So, how does a lawyer decide whether a professional practice should be evaluated by a business valuation specialist? Here are three signs that a professional practice might have value:

1. Actual transactions. If a professional or his/her partners have bought or sold their practices, it is more likely that there is transferrable enterprise goodwill. However, you must distinguish market transactions from succession planning. If the only transactions are between retiring partners and advancing associates, then there may not be much enterprise goodwill.

2.  Subordinates and equipment.  One reason why dental practices are increasingly transferrable is that dental procedures are performed by hygenists and associate dentists. If the owner of the practice is earning profit from other professionals and paraprofessionals, then a buyer might be willing to pay something to step into those shoes.

3.  Excess compensation. If a professional is earning substantially more than industry standards, then the professional’s practice might have enterprise goodwill. No buyer would pay to assume an existing practice if he or she could start a new practice for free – except if the existing practice were more profitable than a new practice would be. This criteria is based on the principle of substitution.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently took up the case of Menard v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d 620 (2009), considering whether the CEO of a privately-held company was receiving a dividend disguised as salary from the business he controlled. The CEO whose salary was questioned was John Menard, founder and controlling shareholder of Menards, a chain of retail hardware and building supply stores. The Tax Court took the position that John Menard’s $20 million salary was really a disguised dividend because it was much greater than the salaries of the Home Depot and Lowe’s CEOs, who earned $2.8 million and $6.1 million respectively.

The appellate court’s opinion in this case is so well-researched that I cannot help but include large blocks of text, starting with its introduction to the subject:

The Internal Revenue Code allows a business to deduct from its taxable income a “reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered,”[or] “payments purely for services.” Occasionally the Internal Revenue Service challenges the deduction of a corporate salary on the ground that it’s really a dividend. A dividend, like salary, is taxable to the recipient, but unlike salary is not deductible from the corporation’s taxable income. So by treating a dividend as salary, a corporation can reduce its income tax liability without increasing the income tax of the recipient. . . As a result of a change in law in 2003, dividends are now taxed at a lower maximum rate than salaries—15 percent, versus 35 percent for salary. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11). This makes the tradeoff more complex; although the corporation avoids tax by treating the dividend as a salary, which is deductible, the employee pays a higher tax. But depending on its tax bracket, the corporation may still save more in tax than the employee pays, and in that event, if the employee owns stock in the corporation, he may, depending on how much of the stock he owns, prefer dividends to be treated as salary. . . . Even before the change in the Internal Revenue Code, treating a dividend as salary was less likely to be attempted in a publicly held corporation, because if the CEO or other officers or employees receive dividends called salary beyond what they are entitled to by virtue of owning stock in the corporation, the other shareholders suffer. But in a closely held corporation, the owners might decide to take their dividends in the form of salary in order to beat the corporate income tax, and there would be no one to complain—except the Internal Revenue Service.

The usual case for forbidding the reclassification (for tax purposes) of dividends as salary is thus that “of a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom draw salaries,” Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1), especially if the corporation does not pay dividends (as such) and some of the shareholders do no work for the corporation but merely cash a “salary” check. A difficult case—which is this case—is thus that of a corporation that pays a high salary to its CEO who works full time but is also the controlling shareholder. The Treasury regulation defines a “reasonable” salary as the amount that “would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances,” § 1.162-7(b)(3), but that is not an operational standard. No two enterprises are alike and no two chief executive officers are alike, and anyway the comparison should be between the total compensation package of the CEOs being compared, and that requires consideration of deferred compensation, including severance packages, the amount of risk in the executives’ compensation, and perks.

Courts have attempted to operationalize the Treasury’s standard by considering multiple factors that relate to optimal compensation. [Citations omitted.] We reviewed a number of these attempts in Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir.1999), and concluded that they were too vague, and too difficult to operationalize, to be of much utility. Multifactor tests with no weight assigned to any factor are bad enough from the standpoint of providing an objective basis for a judicial decision [citations omitted]; multifactor tests when none of the factors is concrete are worse, and that is the character of most of the multifactor tests of excessive compensation. . . . All businesses are different, all CEOs are different, and all compensation packages for CEOs are different.

In Exacto, in an effort to bring a modicum of objectivity to the determination of whether a corporate owner/employee’s compensation is “reasonable,” we created the presumption that “when . . . the investors in his company are obtaining a far higher return than they had any reason to expect, [the owner/employee’s] salary is presumptively reasonable.” But we added that the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the company’s success was the result of extraneous factors, such as an unexpected discovery of oil under the company’s land, or that the company intended to pay the owner/employee a disguised dividend rather than salary. 196 F.3d at 839.

The strongest ground for rebuttal, which brings us back to the basic purpose of disallowing “unreasonable” compensation, is that the employee does no work for the corporation; he is merely a shareholder. [Citations omitted.] Comparison with the compensation of executives of other companies can be helpful if—but it is a big if—the comparison takes into account the details of the compensation package of each of the compared executives, and not just the bottom-line salary. This qualification will turn out to be critical in this case.

Having explained the context of this case, the Circuit Court next explained why the Tax Court’s analysis was wrong, especially its comparison of John Menard’s salary to the salaries earned by the Home Depot and Lowe’s CEOs in that year. The appellate court first rejected the notion that the taxpayer’s $17 million bonus, which was equal to 5% of the company’s net income before taxes, was more likely to be a dividend than salary because it was paid at year’s end; was approved by a board that the CEO controlled without outside directors; must be returned if the IRS should disallow the company’s tax deduction as salary; and exceeded the salaries earned by the CEOs of publicly-traded competitors (Home Depot and Lowe’s). The appellate court noted that the managers of privately-held companies often face greater risk than public companies, warranting greater reward for success:

Of particular importance to this case is the amount of risk in the compensation structure. Risk in corporate compensation is significant in two respects. First, most people are risk averse, and the scholarly literature on corporate compensation suggests that risk aversion is actually an obstacle to efficient corporate management because managers tend to be more risk averse than shareholders. Shareholders can diversify the risk of a particular company by owning a diversified portfolio, but a manager tends to have most of his financial, reputational, and “specific human” capital tied up in his job. [Citations omitted.] So the riskier the compensation structure, other things being equal, the higher the executive’s salary must be to compensate him for bearing the additional risk.

That is not a critical consideration in this case because, as we said, management and ownership in Menards are not divorced. But a second significance of risk in a compensation structure is fully applicable to this case. A risky compensation structure implies that the executive’s salary is likely to vary substantially from year to year—high when the company has a good year, low when it has a bad one. Mr. Menard’s average annual income may thus have been considerably less than $20 million—a possibility the Tax Court ignored. Had the corporation lost money in 1998, Menard’s total compensation would have been only $157,500—less than the salary of a federal judge—even if the loss had not been his fault. The 5 percent bonus plan was in effect for a quarter of a century before the IRS pounced; was it just waiting for Menard to have such a great year that the IRS would
have a great-looking case?

The appellate court also noted that the Tax Court had not considered the total compensation packages of the CEOs from the public companies, such as equity compensation, severance packages, retirement plans, and perks. The appellate court noted that the CEO of Home Depot, whose salary was used as a benchmark, actually earned $124 million over six years, and a $210 million severance package when he was forced out. The Court of Appeals also noted that the Tax Court had not considered the salaries of other senior managers, both of Menards and of the benchmark public companies, which may have indicated that this CEO was more productive and delegated less than average. The Court observed that John Menard worked 14 to 16 hours per day, six to seven days per week.

The Seventh Circuit adopted a skeptical, even sarcastic, tone toward the Tax Court’s remark that the owner of a business has no need for incentive compensation because ownership is incentive enough. The Court of Appeals held that owners should not be treated differently from other managers.

Having concluded that John Menard’s $20 million salary was not excessive, the Court of Appeals reversed.

Gallows humor is intended to comfort us in troubling times, I suppose. An article in the New York Times offered a new definition of “goodwill” appropriate to the ongoing economic recession. In “Losses in Goodwill Values Dog Bank Deals,” the NYT defined goodwill as “the amount they overpaid for a business compared with the sum of its parts.”

Goodwill appears on the balance sheet of a business when it purchases other businesses. In that context, goodwill is equal to the price paid for the acquisition target in excess of its book value. Every good joke contains a kernel of truth.

I will be appearing as the host of an upcoming Pennsylvania Bar Institute seminar, Business Valuation and Divorce. My guests will be Bob Grossman CPA and Melissa Bizyak CPA of Grossman Yanak & Ford. Bob, Melissa and I will be talking about the hot topics that confront business owners and their lawyers in divorce litigation, including double dipping, tax issues, executive compensation, and the market-based and income-capitalization models for business valuation. It’s a lot to cover; time will fly!

The seminar will run from noon until 4:15 p.m on August 12, 2009 at the PBI Conference Center in the Heinz 57 Building on Sixth Avenue, Pittsburgh (next to the Duquesne Club). It will be broadcast by satellite simultaneously in Philadelphia, Erie, Mechanicsburg/Harrisburg, Washington, Greensburg, Reading, West Chester and Wilkes-Barre. PBI is offering an early bird discount for those who register more than 2 days in advance. Register here!